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It is perhaps now a cliché to note how the results of the 2016 Presidential election left
most scholars and journalists dumbfounded and confused. Elites’ shock toward the election
results highlights an intolerable blind spot in academia and journalism on Donald Trump’s
powerful yet previously ignored, or at best misunderstood, voting bloc. Many elites assumed
Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric on race and immigration in the 2016 campaign would be
disqualifying for most voters. While some were turned away, the vast majority of Republican
voters not only energetically supported Trump in 2016 but continue to support him even after
his endless false claims of election fraud before and after his decisive loss in the 2020 election,
and the subsequent riots at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Academia has begun to
respond and some notable work on the subject has been published. Some scholars have argued
that Trump’s rhetoric itself was one powerful driver of support for Trump in 2016. It has also
been suggested that educational attainment and increasing racial diversity and immigration in
the U.S. play a critical role. In any case, much more is left to be understood about the
motivations, feelings and interests of Trump’s predominantly white and rural voting base.
Specifically, much is still unclear about white voters’ reaction to changes in racial and ethnic
diversity in the United States, and how those changes might drive voters to support a candidate
like Donald Trump. This group of voters has become powerful in U.S. politics over time, and
Trump’s messaging continues to drive large sections of the American electorate to consolidate
their voting power and behave in unprecedented ways. This dissertation seeks to help remove
the blind spot on this under-studied group of Americans by answering central questions related
to their sensitivity to political cues on race and immigration, changes to this group over time,
and drivers of political behavior post-2016.
This dissertation adds to two general areas in the scholarship. First, I respond here to a
need to better understand changes in political behavior of white voters as a bloc – i.e. treating
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them like another racial group amongst many – rather than separating white voters into
subgroups (i.e. “college educated,” “rural,” etc.). While white voters remain the largest racial
group in the US, due to increased racial diversity in the last 5-6 decades, the ratio of whites to
non-whites is smaller than it has ever been, and it continues to shrink. Trump owes his success
in 2016 mostly to rural white voters, as do most of his Republican supporters in Congress.
Studying shifts in partisanship over time is a crucial component to fully understanding whites’
political interests and behavior.
Increased racial diversity ultimately means a reduction in whites’ historic political
dominance in the US. If trends continue, whites will become merely another racial minority
amongst others. While many white Americans welcome an increase in multiculturalism and
racial diversity, social science scholars and journalists of all types have long noted a negative
response of subgroups amongst whites to these changes. The second area of scholarship this
dissertation seeks to add to is the degree to which whites’ animus toward minority groups in the
United States influences their policy preferences and behavior. We know some about the
character of this animus, the degree to which it exists amongst white voters, how sensitive
voters are to cultural or political cues on immigration, and how it drives whites’ political
behavior. I seek to observe what association, if any, Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric toward
racial minorities and immigrants has with the ambient level of racial animus amongst his voters
and compare those to white non-Trump voters. I analyze the level of sensitivity Trump voters
have to subtle cues on immigration, and thereby measure the degree to which they are tuned to
demographic changes caused by immigration. I observe how the relationship between animus
and partisanship has changed over time. I compare other explanations for Trump’s support,
such as age and educational attainment, to my findings associated with racial animus.
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There are a number of reasons why it is important to analyze issues of contemporary
animus toward minority groups amongst white voters, and to determine its net effect on the
electoral system. First, whatever new understandings can be had about the 2016 election and
Trump’s seemingly unlikely victory appear to be things society at large have thus far ignored.
Trump’s success was a surprise to much of the public, including journalists and scholars. Such
an intolerable blind spot must be the result of ignorance about the character of our own
electorate. Moreover, understanding what happened in the 2016 election can be beneficial in
predicting trends and outcomes in future elections. If new and profound revelations manage to
seep into the general understanding of American politics perhaps politicians, voters, and
interest groups can use this information to their advantage, and the means by which actors
achieve their ends can be even more effective. In so doing, perhaps a sector of the electorate
that had at one time been ignored might get the attention it needs to address problems within
it. Finally, a discovery as pervasive as the realization that some form of animus toward minority
groups amongst voters indeed played a central role in Trump’s 2016 electoral victory might
signal a hitherto unforeseen, and very troubling problem in American politics: that racism and
anti-immigrant feelings still play a much larger role in our political system than was once
thought. Reaffirming and further clarifying and specifying this discovery is an important task.
There are also scholarly reasons why answering the above questions will be useful.
Content from certain media outlets often seem to assume, if not outright assert, that Trump
voters are stereotypic racist rural Americans. But such an assumption should not be granted
credence in social science literature without rigorous analysis. It does not necessarily follow that
Trump’s use of racist rhetoric is the reason why voters were driven to vote for him. Trump’s
success could be the result of voters’ perception of leadership or business prowess, the desire to
undermine a dominant political class, or myriad other factors unrelated to race. But even if we
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assume race plays no role, it is remarkable that his approval rating has remained relatively
steady, given the degree to which Trump used racial rhetoric during the campaign and
throughout the first 2 and a half years of his presidency. During the 2016 campaign, the average
voter may not have noticed this at all – most voters consume very little news media and are
generally poorly informed. However, Donald Trump has been president for roughly 3 years, and
it seems unlikely that most of his base had not been exposed to some of this racist or antiimmigrant rhetoric, and yet his support remains constant. It is the work of social science
scholars to discover what drove Trump voters to the polls, and what kept their support
constant. While racial resentment has been shown to influence the former, we do not yet know
its relationship with the latter. I seek to add to this discussion by examining specifically the
degree to which racial resentment continues to play a role in support for Trump after the 2016
election. I also seek to examine if racial resentment toward other racial and ethnic groups exists
in Trump’s base.
This dissertation is organized into three sections. In chapter 2, using a 2017 study by
Luttig, et al. as a model, I measure the degree to which white voters respond to a subtle political
cue. Using a 2018 data set, I measure the difference in negative responses between Trump and
non-Trump voters to a cue that elicits ideas on immigration and voting rights. Here I seek to
examine how sensitive white voters, and in particular white Trump voters, are to subtle
suggestions of immigration on access to voting. I find Trump voters tend to react moderately
more negatively to a government program designed to register voters when they are presented
with the cue than when they are not. Conversely, I find non-Trump voters react considerably
more positively toward the program when presented with the cue than when they are not. In
other words, I find that the gap between Trump and non-Trump voters’ feelings toward a
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government program designed to register more voters widens when they are presented with a
subtle political cue.
In chapter 3 I examine the degree to which animus toward racial and immigrant
minorities in the US acts as a driver of political behavior. I analyze separately how resentment
toward Black Americans and animus toward immigrants is associated with continued support for
Trump, and respondents’ choice to vote for relative GOP candidates for US House, US Senate
and Governor. I find that, second only to party identification, racial resentment and animus
toward immigrants is strongly associated with the choice to vote for GOP candidates in the 2018
election, and with support for Trump two years after the 2016 election. Moreover, I find that
this effect is considerably stronger than that of demographic factors like race, gender,
educational attainment and age.
In chapter 4 I analyze changes in white voters’ feelings of racial and immigrant animus in
relation to partisanship over time. Specifically, I examine the degree to which white voters in
the US have self-sorted into one political party or the other based on racial resentment and
animus toward immigrants from 1980 to 2016. I also look at the effect of controlling for
educational attainment and age in this data. I find that feelings of animus toward minority
groups have undergone a dramatic partisan shift since about 2010, where those who tend to
have more feelings of animus are much more likely to be Republican than in previous decades.
Moreover, I demonstrate that feelings of animus are more pronounced amongst white
Republicans with no college degree. Finally, I show that age plays little to no role in this
relationship. In chapter 5, I summarize my findings and offer suggestions for future research.
Before adding to the discussion, I must first briefly summarize discoveries in previous
publications from political scientists who specialize in voter behavior and public opinion to
determine what we already know, and therefore what still needs to be known. To start, I

6

provide below a summary of some foundational scholarship that describes broad characteristics
in the electorate, including important recent changes relevant to this dissertation. In the 14th
edition of Political Behavior of the American Electorate, Elizabeth A. Theiss-Morse, et al.
describe political behavior after the 2016 election. The main thrust of the book is that the 2016
election was remarkably different than previous election cycles, largely due to the highly
unorthodox, inflammatory style of the soon-to-be 45th US President, Donald J. Trump. In this
new electoral environment, Theiss-Morse, et al. seek to answer several questions relevant to
this dissertation, including who votes and why, and to what degree party loyalties, candidates’
personalities, and the electorate’s attitudes and political choices influence voters’ choices.
Theiss-Morse, et al. also seek to report broader trends in American political behavior using large
data sources like the American National Election Survey. They examine changes in the
electorate on various dimensions in every general election year over time. One such finding
relevant to this dissertation is that whites are becoming a decreasing percentage of population,
and racial diversity continues to increase in the United States. (Theiss-Morse, et al., 2018) This
phenomenon is often connected in popular discourse to an increasing anxiety amongst a subset
of white voters, that perhaps their decreasing majority in electoral politics causes an increase in
feelings of animus toward racial and immigrant groups.
As this dissertation focuses primarily on white Americans, a broad outline on the
political behavior of these voters is useful. In White Voters in 21st Century America, George
Hawley describes sweeping demographic changes in the United States over the past five to six
decades. For example, in the 1960s, outside the South and some urban areas, most Americans
were white, but by the 2010s the American electorate had become increasingly racially diverse.
This combined with decreasing voter turnout compared to other racial groups results in a
relative decline in whites’ influence on the outcome of elections. As a result, public discourse on
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race has shifted so that whites must be discussed as their own unique voting bloc. Moreover,
Hawley notes that of the two major US political parties, the Republican Party has emerged as a
predominantly “white” party, where Democrats have attracted a much more racially diverse
voting base. Despite the diminishing role, Hawley notes that whites remain the largest racial
group in the United States and will remain highly influential long after they are eclipsed by nonwhites. He also points out a distinction in the way scholars study whites and non-whites: racial
minorities are often examined as a whole, while whites are broken into subgroups (i.e., working
class, college educated, Southerners, etc.). He argues that eventually whites will be just another
racial minority amongst many and paying attention to the political behavior of “whites as
whites” might be helpful in better explaining shifts and characteristics of the American
electorate. (Hawley, 2014)
In their brief article “Introduction – ‘Gapology’ and the Presidential vote,” Laura R. Olson
and John C. Green briefly introduce a series of journal articles emphasizing the importance of
various voting gaps along multiple demographic dimensions in the 2004 Presidential election.
The article outlines partisan voting gaps in demographic measures like race, religion, class,
gender, education, and age as of 2004. This study serves first as an artifact of partisan voting
gaps in variables such as race, age, and education that are relevant to this study. It also provides
a brief discussion on the ways in which these variables might interact with one another, and
how that might impact partisanship. (Olson & Green, 2006) This 2004 snapshot is evidence that
partisanship is connected to the relationship between these demographic categories and can be
used to compare with more contemporary analyses. It also suggests that, as the Republican
Party becomes whiter, and the Democratic Party more diverse, voters with feelings of racial
resentment are likely to favor Republicans over Democrats as the years progress.
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Identity is an extraordinarily important component to any group in understanding their
political behavior. Two recent books are helpful in illustrating important components of the
identity of Trump voters. The first, Arlie Russell Hochschild’s Strangers in their Own Land, is an
earnest attempt to hear from conservatives themselves on what it is they find compelling about
their political identity. She resists the common position of other progressives to paint
conservatives as poorly informed, and who “vote against their own interests,” and instead
searches for a deeper, more empathetic explanation. Hochschild spends time in rural,
conservative areas in Louisiana and befriends many working-class Louisianans over the course of
5 years to attempt to explain their political identity. Hochschild examines this identity through
multiple dimensions, including the “keyhole” issue of the environment, the economic and social
pressures they feel are foisted on to them by elites in urban areas, religious influences, and
other factors. In her fifth and final year in the South, she examines the excitement felt by these
Louisianans for the rise of Donald Trump, arguing that Trump made an emotional appeal to their
interests that was beguiling, and would eventually work. (Hocschild, 2016) This book provides a
more qualitative description of conservatives that is often absent in social science research. It
puts pressure on the claim that these individuals’ political behavior is often contradictory to
their needs.
In the second book which helps explain Trump voters’ identity, The Tea Party and the
Remaking of Republican Conservatism, Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson study the rise
and motivations of the Tea Party movement across the country in early 2009 to its height in the
early 2010s, and the effect it has had on the American right at-large. They attempt to both
explain how the Tea Party fits in the bigger American politics picture using large surveys and
social science datasets, and observe actual actors closely as they meet with one another and
engage with the broader public to collect more qualitative, human-level data. They find that the
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older, middle-class, predominantly white Tea Party voters who claim opposition to “big
government” are actually supportive of big social safety net programs like Social Security,
Medicare and veterans’ programs. Instead, they report opposition to tax money ending up in
the hands of “freeloaders” like immigrants and lower-class workers. (Skocpol & Williamson,
2012) Ultimately, Skocpol & Williamson’s work is useful because it helps to illustrate a highly
influential streak in the identity of Republicans. One might reasonably argue that the “antifreeloader” Tea Party base seemed to have regrouped to support the 2016 Trump campaign.
Trump’s was a Republican campaign that was not overwhelmingly hostile to big social safety net
programs for Americans, but that has consistently used inflammatory messaging toward
disadvantaged groups, and especially immigrants.
Other scholars have probed the real-world outcomes of this identity prior to the 2016
election. In “The Racialization of Electoral Fairness in the 2008 and 2012 United States
Presidential Elections,” Jacob Appleby & Christopher Federico study the degree to which racial
animus and endorsement of racial stereotypes affects White voters’ perceptions of election
fairness in the two elections in which a Black man, Barack Obama, won. Appleby & Federico find
that Whites were less likely to trust the outcome of the 2008 and 2012 elections if they also
reported increased racial resentment and endorsement of stereotypes. Moreover, this effect
was stronger among White Republican voters – those voters who viewed the result as
unwelcome. Finally, they find that this effect is unique to the 2008 and 2012 elections, where
Barack Obama was on the ballot. This may help explain recent changes in the electorate, which
I address in further detail in Chapter 4.
Before we can decide whether racism and racial resentment played any sort of role in
the 2016 election, we must first understand the character of contemporary racism, and make
distinctions between it and “old racism” common during the civil rights era and before. Many
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scholars point out a kind of “character shift” in racism, and in so doing make a distinction
between “old” and “new” racism. Carmines et al. explain how “old racism” is a far more blatant
form centered on the perception that blacks are biologically inferior to whites, especially in
terms of intelligence, but in other ways as well. Carmines and Sniderman argue this form was
“…racism in its rawest and most primitive form,” was far more common in the Jim Crow South
than it is today, and was used as a justification for slavery, economic exploitation,
disenfranchisement and de jure segregation. Scholars have observed a steep decline in
biological racism since the Civil Rights movement. By no means has this type of crude, primitive
racism vanished, but it has by and large been relegated to the margins of American society
(100).
However the decline and marginalization of biological racism should not be conflated
with a decline in racism generally. In “Is It Really Racism?: The Origins of White Americans
Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies,” Sears et al. examine an apparent paradox in racial politics
in the United States. On one side of this paradox, the authors describe the fall of
institutionalized racism, including Jim Crow Laws in the South and elsewhere. They also note
that “old-fashioned” racist ideas, in which people of color are considered biologically inferior, or
that societies ought to foster racial segregation and formal racial discrimination, are only held by
members of fringe groups. In place of these ideas is relative legal equality, and the wide-spread
belief in racial equality. On the other hand, the authors describe millions of voters’ strong
resistance to policies which would alleviate present-day systemic racial inequality.
One possible explanation for this paradox, backed by substantial scholarly research, is
that the role of racism has not entirely disappeared. This manifests in academic studies which
observe that negative racial stereotypes still exist, whites are more opposed to racially targeted
policies than to policies for poor people of all races, whites are more opposed to black mayoral
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candidates, and so on. (Sears, et al., 17) However, other scholars argue that, when nonracial
attitudes (such as ideological conservatism or individualism) are controlled for, race has little
independent effect on public opinion. (Sears, et al., 18)
Instead, some scholars argue that racism has shifted character into a type of “new
racism.” This new type of racism is often used interchangeably with the term “racial
resentment,” in Kinder & Sanders’ influential 1996 book Divided By Color. Racial resentment,
they argue, is much more subtle and sophisticated, and often far more difficult to detect than
“old racism.” Rather than focusing on perceived biological differences, the expression of which
is often blunt and easily identifiable, Kinder & Sanders describe racial resentment as “… the
conjunction of whites’ feelings toward blacks and their support for American values, especially
secularized versions of the Protestant ethic. (293)” Kinder & Sanders describe how American
voters who are implicitly affected by, or explicitly subscribe to, racial resentment might believe
that blacks lack moral values like individualism, hard work, discipline and self-sacrifice, and that
such values are central to the white race and American society at large. These voters also
believe blacks do not try hard enough to overcome difficulties or that they take what they have
not earned. Kinder & Sanders argue racial resentment “… is expressed in the language of
American Individualism.” (106) Kinder & Sanders claim this new form of racism to be “… the
primary ingredient in white opinion on racial affairs,” which dominates views of White
Americans. They claim this phenomenon is not observed merely on occasion or on exceptionally
controversial issues such as affirmative action. The effect of racial resentment, in their
judgement, is felt across a spectrum of racial policies (Carmines et al. 101).
As one might imagine, measuring this new subtle form of racial prejudice is not without
difficulties. One must be sure to isolate the indicators of “new racism,” and to control for other
factors that might be easily confused or conflated with racial resentment. Such factors might

12

include specific policy preferences, or views on class or individualism. In Divided by Color,
Kinder & Sanders claim their methodology takes special care to separate racial resentment from
other phenomena. Their methodology consists of a series of 6 “thermometer” style opinion
questions, in which respondents are asked whether they “Agree strongly,” “Agree somewhat,”
“Neither agree or disagree,” “Disagree somewhat,” or “Disagree strongly” with the statement.
These questions are designed to identify the level of racial resentment in respondents to the
exclusion of other factors. (106) Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment questions are as follows:
1. Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if
they tried.
2. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
3. Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black
than from a white person.
4. Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
5. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
6. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

The opinion data these questions attempt to withdraw from respondents are subtle by
design. They do not require whites to openly declare opinions on inferiority of blacks to whites,
let alone admit to any degree of overt racism within the. Instead, the questions “…distinguish
between those whites who are generally sympathetic toward blacks and those who are
generally unsympathetic (Kinder & Sanders 106).” Kinder & Sanders compare their questions to
Theodore Adorno’s “F-scale” personality test intended to measure anti-Semitism. The questions
in both cases are intended to withdraw expressions of “…subtle hostility without seeming to
offend the democratic values that most subjects would feel bound to support.” The questions
are worded to deem “fair-minded and reasonable” on their face. (Kinder & Sanders 106)
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Kinder & Sanders make bold claims for the profound strength in the effect of racial
resentment in American politics. First, they argue its impact is “unequaled” by any other factor
in shaping voters’ views on specific policies like school desegregation, busing, fair employment
and workplace treatment, and affirmative action in employment and higher education. Racial
resentment is more impactful on voters’ policy preferences than self-interest, support for
limited government, ideology, the race of the interviewer as well as demographic factors like
age, region, gender, Hispanic ethnicity, family income, education, and occupational status of
respondents. Second, Kinder & Sanders claim a degree of validity which other scholars
characterize as “truly impressive” (Carmines 100). Many scholars since the publication of
Divided by Color have reaffirmed and added to the merits of racial resentment. Below I discuss
a set of studies that apply Kinder & Sanders’ findings to contemporary politics.
A central component to racial resentment that must be understood in order to conduct
a proper analysis is the “group-centric” nature of public opinion. In a separate publication,
Kinder and Thomas Nelson demonstrated in 1996 that group-centrism is a fundamental
component in shaping public opinion on a diverse range of issues. Group-centric thought
“…functions as an efficient heuristic that conveniently reduces the complexity of policy politics
to a simple judgmental standard. (1056)” Nelson & Kinder argue this finding explains
Americans’ attitudes on policies related to race, class and basic values such as free speech.
While they concede that groups-centrism is not the only driver of public opinion on
controversial policies such as affirmative action, welfare programs and tolerance of
“disagreeable” speech, Nelson & Kinder argue that group identity is always elemental in
American public opinion. (1056)
Nelson & Kinder also find that the degree to which group-centrism influences public
opinion is subject to how an issue or policy is framed by elites. The claim of group-centric
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public opinion is founded upon the connection average voters perceive between government
policy and visible social grouping of one type or another. This connection might include policies
with tangible benefits in the form of redistribution of wealth or other benefits, and it might also
be more symbolic, such as the perceived recognition or legitimacy of one group at the expense
of another. As Nelson & Kinder admit, not all citizens necessarily make such connections, and
given the “multi-faceted” nature of public issues, most public policies are subject to multiple
interpretations, and different groups often attribute different meanings to the same policies.
Still, Nelson & Kinder argue that group-centrism plays a more prominent role in public opinion
when political elites intentionally frame an issue in a way that highlights differences, either real
or perceived, between groups. (1056-57)
Both the above findings by Nelson & Kinder are relevant to my questions on public
opinion of Trump voters. First, the group-centric nature of public opinion, particularly racial
group identity, is central to Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment measurements. Sides, et al. and
others have demonstrated that Trump voters’ resentment toward African Americans was highly
salient in the 2016 election. In simple terms, scholars used Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment
model to show how white racial group identity and group-based values led to support for
Donald Trump in the 2016 election. (Sides, et al. 2018) Kimball, et al. observe that wellreported increases partisanship and political polarization in the American electorate can be
directly attributed to group attitudes and outperform ideological positions in explanations of
choice for president in the 2016 election. (170)
Nelson & Kinder’s second observation relevant to my research is that political elites
amplify group-centrism through issue framing. One of Trump’s most constant sources of
criticism is the inflammatory way in which he frames issues in American Politics. Trump has
been accused in abundance of framing issues under a rubric of white identity politics. This
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includes referring to Mexican and South American immigrants as “rapists,” referring to
developing nations as “shithole countries,” and others. If Nelson & Kinder’s observation is
correct, Trump’s framing has served to amplify white group identity, making group-centrism in
public opinion all the more important in the 2016 election and after.
Scholars have used Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment measurements often and in
multiple contexts, and most researchers tend to view them as highly useful in explaining public
opinion. However, there are those authors who criticize the theory on multiple grounds.
Carmines, et al. and others argue there are flaws in the means by which racial resentment is
measured in a way that undermines Kinder & Sanders’ claims of validity and strength. Critics
argue that measuring “new racism” remains problematic because of the questions’ ambiguous
nature. In particular, new racism questions ask respondents to answer complex questions that
may elicit an affirmative response, but for reasons other than racial resentment or other forms
of prejudice. Instead, answers may be driven by respondents’ views on individualism, hard
work, etc., and the questions Kinder & Sanders ask do not adequately isolate and control for
these values (Carmines et al. 102).
Kinder & Sanders also argue for the soundness of their theory because of its
“convergent validity,” or the degree to which the theoretical concept has similar relationships
with other theoretically relevant variables (Carmines, et al. 102). Scores on racial resentment,
Kinder & Sanders claim, can be compared to prior reliable analyses of racial stereotypes, and a
comparable trend between the two analyses is observed. The comparison of the racial
resentment model to well-regarded, trusted measurements on racial prejudice suggests that the
validity of Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment is strengthened. However, Carmines et al. argue
that Kinder & Sanders’ results are inflated by a flawed scale used in their analysis. Kinder &
Sanders use a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 represents the view that whites are superior to blacks,
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and .5, not 0, measures those who believe whites and blacks are neutral toward one another.
This means the 0 score indicates that respondents view blacks as superior to whites, arbitrarily
crowding 97% of respondents between .5 and 1, and thereby inflating the regression coefficient.
When this is corrected, Carmines, et al. observe that Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment model
is not a valid substitute for racial stereotypes, and therefore they cannot claim to have achieved
convergent validity (Carmines, et al. 102).
Other critics of racial resentment claim Kinder & Sanders’ use of the relationship
between racial resentment and racial policy preferences is flawed, particularly due to what
Carmines, et al refer to as “the Danger of Tautology,” or the restating of an already established
theory in different language. Kinder & Sanders argue that a strength of their argument, as
stated above, is its overlap and congruency with already established measures on racial
prejudice. However, some scholars argue that this apparent overlap is merely Kinder & Sanders
asking respondents whether blacks need, require or are entitled to help and assistance – just
like questions in prior studies on opposition to racial policy – except in alternative ways.
Schuman (2000) argues that racial resentment and studies on opposition to racial policies, for
example, are “different aspects of the same general construct. (205)” In this case, Kinder &
Sanders’ racial resentment theory would break no new scholarly ground, and provide no update
in the available tools used to describe the new character of racism in the United States.
Despite those who highlight apparent problems with the theory, there are many
scholars who find value in racial resentment theory. Among them are authors who have
attempted to strengthen the theory at its perceived weak points. In “Reexamining Racial
Resentment: Conceptualization and Content,” Wilson & Davis reevaluate criticisms of
components of Kinder & Sanders’ original racial resentment theory, and then seek to update
and strengthen the theory by making it more direct, and by addressing and eliminating some
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criticisms. In so doing, Wilson & Davis introduce Explicit Racial Resentment (EXR), which they
argue is an emerging theory intended to identify the impact of “new racism” on American
politics, just as Kinder & Sanders’ original theory sought to do, yet in an updated, more reliable
and scrutable methodology. They argue through EXR, racial resentment will be placed under
much more scrutiny, therefore strengthening the measurement and producing more reliable
results. Wilson & Davis’ questions are as follows:
1: I resent all of the special attention/favors that African Americans receive; other
Americans like me have problems too.
2: African Americans should not need any special privileges when slavery and racism are
things of the past
3: How concerned are you that the special privileges for African Americans place you at
an unfair advantage when you have done nothing to harm them?
4: For African Americans to succeed they need to stop using racism as an excuse.
One core update in Wilson & Davis’ approach is to much more explicitly define racial
resentment. Wilson & Davis define “resentment” as an “… explicit feeling of animosity or
antipathy toward a person or group of people who are perceived to be unfair or unjust
recipients of some outcome” (120). This includes a sense of injustice toward other groups or
individuals who claim to deserve more. Therefore, Wilson & Davis argue that racial resentment
“…may also encompass anger, bitterness, or concern related to one racial group’s beliefs about
the deservingness of special considerations on the basis of race for another group. (121)”
“Special considerations” include white voters’ perception of violations of norms and rules
related to fairness and deservingness. These voters find the use of race as a justification for
social problems, inequality or celebration as unfair and invalid. However, a racially resentful
person, in spite of the above, will take offense to charges of racism and racial discrimination.
This is an important difference between racially resentful people and explicit white supremacists
or white nationalists who still subscribe to “old racism.” The former denies having racist
18

tendencies or biases, while the latter openly admits and embraces the label of “racist.” (120121)
Another update of EXR is to measure racial resentment through much more explicit
questions that remove the ambiguity and confusion of Kinder & Sanders’ questions alleged by
Carmines, et al. and others. Wilson & Davis ask respondents a set of four questions that, they
argue, improve upon Kinder & Sanders’ questions in a number of ways. First, Wilson & Davis
claim their questions are “…descriptive of the content of racial resentment concepts,” and
“explicitly state the nature of resentment toward blacks. (121)” Second, Wilson & Davis’
questions do not contain references to government programs or politics, nor is there ambiguity
in the meaning of the agreement with the items.
Still, scholars tend to maintain that Kinder & Sanders’ original set of questions are highly
useful in isolating views on subtle prejudice and racial resentment. Much of what has been
written since 2016 focuses on racial resentment in relation to Trump and his supporters. Sides,
et al. attempt to clarify important questions related to the 2016 Presidential Election in their
2017 article “The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost and Won." They argue that, in addition to
broader pre-existing political and economic factors, choices made in both the Clinton and Trump
campaigns in the 2016 election activated voters’ racial, ethnic and social identities. “Identityfocused” campaign messaging raised Trump’s cache amongst white voters without a college
degree, and this would become a huge advantage for him in the electoral college. Moreover,
Sides, et al. argue that the often-repeated claim that economic displacement or feelings of
anger toward the government amongst rural voters does not explain Trump’s popularity with
whites in 2016. Rather, they argue that attitudes on race explained the boost in support for
Trump amongst white voters. Moreover, they claim the shift of non-college educated whites
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toward support for the GOP started well before 2016, during the Obama Administration. This
shift, they argue, was driven in large part by racial attitudes. (Sides, et al, 2017)
Like scholars before him, Andrew M. Engelhardt (2019) argues that white voters’ racial
attitudes were a key factor in their choice for presidential candidate in the 2016 election.
However, while some scholars argue that Trump’s racialized rhetoric “activated” these feelings
in the 2016 campaign, Englehardt argues for an alternate explanation. He observes trends
preceding Trump that suggest white voters have become increasingly polarized into partisan
groups as a result of racial views. He argues that most of the change was driven by Democrats
between 2012 and 2016, who have increasingly attracted voters that are supportive of policies
and candidates that benefit racial minorities. (Englehardt, 2019) Englehardt’s piece is useful
because it provides an alternative explanation to a popular view on the cause of Trump’s
success. In this study, he problematizes this view and argues scholars should not always accept
one established explanation for a phenomenon and should instead be open to multiple
hypotheses.
The degree to which education plays a peripheral yet important role in an American’s
choice to vote for Trump, and the degree to which educational attainment can be directly
connected to racial resentment, is key in finding a source for Americans’ racial resentment. In
“Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism
and Sexism,” Schaffner, et al. describe the role racism, sexism and education played in the
election of Donald Trump. They begin by noting a discrepancy between white Trump voters with
and without a college degree. Amongst college educated whites, Trump only held a 4-point
advantage over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. However, he enjoyed a 40point advantage over Clinton among whites who were not college educated. They describe how
Trump voters exhibit higher levels of sexism and racism and claim that this is the result of a
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lower education level. They hypothesize that lack of education and heightened sexism and
racism were much more strongly related to support for Trump than economic issues or other
concerns. Ultimately, they claim, racism and sexism played a pivotal role in Donald Trump’s
successful 2016 bid for President, and that in fact, “… these attitudes explain at least two-thirds
of the education gap among white voters in the 2016 presidential election” (11).
According to Schaffner, et al., differences in voting behavior in presidential elections
between college educated and non-college educated whites remained relatively similar
between 1980 and 1996. Between 2000 and 2012, they observed a small 5 to 7 point gap in
voting behavior, but the discrepancy remained constant. However, in the 2016 election,
Schaffner, et al. saw the gap widen to 18 points – nearly 3 times larger than previous
presidential elections. College educated whites were “…more supportive of Clinton than they
had been of Obama in 2012, while whites without a college degree moved even more
dramatically toward Trump.” (11) According to exit polls in Wisconsin, Michigan and
Pennsylvania -- the 3 most crucial battleground states in the 2016 election -- non-college
educated whites made up between 40 and 47 percent of the electorate and favored Trump over
Clinton by about 30 points (12).
Schaffner et al. address two possible explanations for the education divide in the 2016
election. First, the intensification of economic divides amongst whites caused white workingclass voters to feel left behind during the economic recovery in Obama’s presidency. Trump
voters felt his populist economic message would help them. Scholars like Bartels, who claim the
economy tends to be the most important factor in deciding elections, would likely emphasize
economic struggles over other factors. Schaffner, et al. grant Bartels and others that economic
concerns amongst non-college educated whites was indeed “part of the story.” (12-13)
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However, Schaffner et al.’s second point is that racism and sexism acted as a driver
toward support or opposition to Trump, and the impact is far more salient in explaining the
white education gap than mere economics. They claim Trump’s willingness to make explicitly
racist remarks during an African American Presidency, and to make overtly sexist remarks during
the first major female candidate for president, became a powerful dividing line in the 2016
election. Trump’s racist and sexist remarks tended to appeal to less educated whites and turn
away more educated whites. (13-15) Schaffner et al. argue Trump’s appeal to racism and
sexism accounts for 2/3rds of the education gap amongst white voters. (11)
Political cues are a common measurement tool used to implicitly influence views or
feelings from survey respondents. Cues prime subjects, triggering feelings about the subject
matter before they respond to follow-up questions, and therefore evoke a response they may
not have otherwise revealed. For example, Malka & Lelkes study the propensity to accept or
reject ideas, attitudes and beliefs based on one’s conservative or liberal identity. The authors
gave respondents questions about their opinions on specific policies that were first framed with
an ideological cue such as telling respondents “liberals/conservatives oppose X policy.”
Respondents are unaware they have been primed to agree or disagree based on their political
group affiliation. The results are then compared with a study that asked the same questions,
but without the ideological cue. The authors observe a very strong tendency for respondents to
conform with their ideological identity with the addition of the cues. (Malka & Lelkes 2011)
Racial and immigrant cues work in a similar way to Malka & Lelkes’ study. Racial and
immigrant cues are a type of political cue designed to elicit a conditioned response about racial
views from those surveyed without their awareness. Respondents are then asked follow-up
questions about a policy or issue that does not directly reference race or immigration.
Respondents who were primed by the racial or immigrant cue before answering will then view
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the policy or issue in the question through the prism of race, while a control group, who was not
primed by a cue, answers the question at face value. Scholars can then compare the two groups
for possible variations in response to the questions to see if views on race or immigration are
evoked by the cues and intensify responses.
The model for Chapter 2 in this study is a paper published in 2017 by Luttig, et al., which
showed racial resentment served as a driver to vote for Trump in 2016. In “Supporters and
opponents of Donald Trump respond differently to racial cues: An experimental analysis,”
Luttig, et al. use racial political cues as a methodology to argue that Trump’s racial rhetoric in
the campaign signaled his sympathy toward those who held resentment toward blacks. As a
result, Luttig, et al. claim racial resentment served as Trump supporters’ primary driver to vote
for the candidate. With a relatively simple quantitative study, Luttig et al. use a political cue to
elicit a conditioned response about government aid in avoiding foreclosure. Subjects are
prompted with a picture of a dismayed man in front of a house with a foreclosure sign in the
lawn, and introductory text:
“Recently there have been proposals to help people who are struggling with
their mortgages and may lose their homes.”
Participants then “…indicate their support for the mortgage-relief program, whether the
possibility of such help made them angry, and the extent to which they blamed potential
beneficiaries of the program for their own predicament.” (Luttig, et al., 3) The question makes
no explicit mention of race, nor does it imply that the proposed policy has any connection with
racial political issues. Respondents are split into halves, and while they are all given precisely
the same introductory text and questions, the picture that accompanies the question is
different. One half sees a picture with a white man, while the other half sees a picture with a
black man, and all other elements of the pictures remain constant. Respondents are expected
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to respond implicitly to the racial difference in the pictures as it relates to government
assistance. The discrepancy in responses to the two pictures is then compared to support or
opposition to Trump in 2016. (Luttig, et al.)
Luttig, et al. found Trump voters reported increases in opposition to help with
foreclosures, feelings of anger toward such a policy, and feelings of blame toward those who
seek foreclosure assistance when the question was accompanied by the picture of the black
man. Luttig, et al. observed the opposite effect of the black racial cue on voters opposed to
Trump. Non-Trump subjects responded with increased support for mortgage assistant programs
and expressed less anger and blame when it was accompanied by the picture of the black man.
Luttig, et al. demonstrated that attitudes on racial resentment can be primed through
use of a relatively explicit racial cue. Racial differences were made obvious between the two
men in the pictures, and all other elements were the same. Those responses can be compared
with answers to other questions, including support for or opposition to a presidential candidate.
If Trump supporters, for example, responded to the pictures of men of different races in the
same way, the difference in race of the two men would have had no effect on their preference
for the policy. However, since Trump supporters responded substantially differently to the
picture of the white man than they did the black man, it is reasonable to conclude that feelings
of animus or resentment toward blacks is connected to support for Trump, and to views on a
potentially racialized policy.
Luttig, et al.’s findings are remarkable for a number of reasons. First, it again
demonstrated the existence of racial resentment amongst Trump voters in contrast to Trump
opponents. Second, Luttig et al. demonstrated the black racial cue primed subjects to feel more
sympathetic toward the policy of it was implied that it helped black. Third, this is a notably
explicit treatment to withdraw and measure feelings of racial animus. The only explanation for
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a discrepancy in responses to the prompt are obvious racial differences between the two men in
the pictures. Fourth, those who react negatively to the policy when it is accompanied with the
picture is of a black man are disproportionately Trump voters. (Luttig, 2017)
In addition to racial resentment, I also seek to gauge white Americans’ feelings of
animus toward immigrants. To date, fewer articles on the effect of immigrant animus in
American politics have been published than that of racial resentment. However, Adriano Udani
& David Kimball have authored two papers relevant to this discussion. In the first, “Making
American Elections Great Again: Immigrant Resentment, Elite Rhetoric and Public Support for
Voter Identification Restrictions,” Udani & Kimball observe a strong relationship between voter
identification restrictions and resentment toward immigrants. This “immigrationalization” of
voter identification restriction means views on immigration predict public support for such
policies. In the second paper, “Immigrant Resentment and Voter Fraud Beliefs in the U.S.
Electorate,” Udani & Kimball argue that immigrant resentment has a strong relationship to voter
fraud beliefs. Respondents who believe voter fraud is widespread are more likely to believe
immigrants pose a hostile threat, and in fact such beliefs “nourish” public beliefs about voter
fraud. These two papers illustrate that some voters connect their feelings of immigrant animus
to fears about voter fraud. This information is useful because it demonstrates a connection
between a policy issue and immigration, a relationship which can be used to study drivers of
immigrant animus among specific groups.
In another article connecting resentment toward minority groups and voter fraud, “The
Foundations of Public Opinion on Voter ID Laws: Political Predispositions, Racial Resentment,
and Information Effects,” David C Wilson and Paul R Brewer examine the relationship between
one’s own ideology, party ID and racial attitudes and support for voter ID laws. They find these
so-called “political predispositions” influence respondents’ support for voter ID laws.

25

Additionally, they observe a “polarizing” effect between liberals and conservatives – an effect
that reliably intensifies for those more familiarized with the policy. Also, respondents who
perceive voter fraud as “common” are more likely to support voter ID laws. The article is
relevant to this dissertation because it illustrates the role of party ID.
In “Why Can’t We Agree on ID? Partisanship, Perceptions of Fraud, and Public Support
for Voter Identification Laws,” John Kane uncovers important details of the partisan nature of
support for voter ID laws. Using nationally representative data, Kane finds first that partisan
identity with the Republican Party is highly predictive of public support for strict voter ID laws.
Moreover, Kane finds two “asymmetries” between respondents who report identification with
the Republican and Democratic parties. First, Kane finds that when Republican respondents
discover even an insignificant degree of voter fraud, support for voter ID laws increases.
However, Republican respondents’ views do not change when they are told that voter ID laws
are used strategically to benefit a particular political party. Conversely, Democratic
respondents’ support for voter ID laws remains largely unchanged when confronted with news
about possible voter fraud, but support for voter ID laws becomes contingent upon which
political party stands to benefit. In other words, Kane finds that Democrats are more concerned
with the strategic use of voter ID laws by Republicans than to prevent voter fraud.
Reny, et al. argue that attitudes about immigration and race provided a stronger
explanation than feelings of economic dislocation for the shift of white working-class voters to
support Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election. They inspect the previously untested claim
that Trump’s combined rhetoric on economics and immigration animated white working-class
voters who did not vote in 2012 to support Trump in 2016. They find that, among those white
voters who switched to either Trump or Clinton, some non-working class white voters, but far
more working-class white voters, switched. Moreover, the primary reason for the switch, they
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argue, was due to attitudes on race and immigration, not economic concerns. These findings are
relevant to this study because they suggest that white voters are increasingly sorting into
partisan groups based on attitudes on race and immigration, and that feelings of economic
displacement are less important. (Reny, et al. 2019)
The bases for the main hypotheses in this dissertation are as follows: First, as noted
above, scholars have observed that a primary driver of voters’ support for Donald Trump in the
2016 Presidential Election was racial resentment toward Black Americans. Arguably Trump’s
rhetoric against immigrants is comparable to, if not more intense and frequent than, his antiblack rhetoric. If voters were driven to the polls to support Trump in 2016 because he was
perceived to share their views on resentment toward Blacks, and Trump’s rhetoric against
immigrants is perceived to be at least equal to anti-Black rhetoric, voters may also be driven to
support him as a result of immigrant resentment in 2018, similar to racial resentment in 2016.
Second, Trump’s approval rating throughout his tenure as US President was historically
low, but remarkably steady, ranging from no higher than the low 40s to no lower than the high
30s. All the while, Trump has continued to use inflammatory rhetoric toward different racial
groups, and for that matter on a much more visible platform as President of the United States
than as a candidate, and his core supporters mostly did not abandon him. This sustained and
loyal support could say something useful about Trump voters that is relevant to this research. If
voters were driven to the polls to support Trump because of racial resentment in 2016, and
have largely remained loyal since, it is plausible that their continued support is the result of
racial and immigrant resentment in 2018 and beyond. It is also highly likely that feelings of
racial resentment and immigrant animus were not instantly created when Trump was elected,
but instead existed in some form prior to them. Trump may have used these feelings to his
advantage in the election, but they undoubtedly existed before the 2016 campaign. If these
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feelings existed prior to Trump, it would be worth finding out how closely held these feelings are
by his supporters, how these feelings drive political behavior, and how sensitive voters are to
environmental triggers of these feelings.
The goal of this dissertation is to address unanswered questions about racial
resentment and animus toward immigrants amongst Trump voters, and about the choice
sustained beyond 2016 to support for Donald Trump and continued approval of his performance
in the White House. I want to know whether existing methods to measure racial resentment
can be applied to feelings toward immigrants from Central and South America. I also want to
know if racial resentment continues to act as a driver for support for Trump and his policies
beyond the 2016 election, and if these trends are recent or if they have been constant for some
time. President Trump continues to touch on race and immigration in his rhetoric. Are racial
resentment and immigrant animus still important beliefs in public opinion today? How have
these beliefs changed over time? Are they connected to party identification in a new way, or
have they always been connected? Are voters as sensitive to political cues on immigration and
voter fraud as they are to cues on race and mortgage assistance?
Another task left open in the scholarship is to explain how demographic factors like
educational attainment and age serves as a driver to support Trump. As stated above, scholars
have demonstrated that Trump voters have strikingly lower levels of educational attainment
than non-Trump voters, which is a surprising new development in the 2016 election cycle.
Scholars ought to investigate this realization further and determine whether the educational
discrepancy can be linked to racial resentment in some way, or if racial resentment is a more
plausible explanation. The following is an attempt to address the above central questions
through quantitative analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
Environmental Immigrant Cues Polarize Trump and non-Trump voters on Voter Registration
Policy
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ABSTRACT:
This study examines the effect a political “immigrant” cue has in increasing polarization
between Trump and non-Trump voters’ views on a government voter registration policy. I seek
to observe whether Trump and non-Trump voters produce contrasting reactions to subtle
environmental cues on immigrants. This study demonstrates Trump and non-Trump voters
become increasingly polarized on their support for a government voter registration program and
feelings of anger toward the program when presented with a subtle immigrant cue in a
photograph. In both cases, Trump voters reacted quite subtly to the immigrant cue, while nonTrump voters account for most of this polarizing effect. Results measuring polarization on
feelings of blame toward those in danger of losing their right to vote were not always
statistically significant.
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A growing number of authors have linked the success of Donald Trump in the 2016
Presidential election to white voters’ animus toward racial minorities. So-called “racial
resentment” has been shown to serve as the most salient driver of support for Trump in the
2016 election – more important than other factors like educational attainment or rural
resentment (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Schaffner, et al. 2018). It is implied, if not stated outright,
that Trump’s more inflammatory “racialized” rhetoric served as a signal that sharply divided
white voters (Luttig, et al. 2017).
It is argued that those white voters who harbor resentment toward racial minorities
were drawn to Trump, and those who are sympathetic to racial minorities were repelled by him.
However, one could argue that Trump’s anti-immigrant comments have been much more
frequent and explicit than instances of racialized rhetoric. One might intuit that similar opposite
reactions amongst voters who opposed and supported Trump in 2016 could be found, and yet
scholars have not studied such a phenomenon to date. Luttig, et al. demonstrated that, when
presented with a racial cue, Trump supporters and opponents become more polarized on
policies that are not otherwise directly tied to race. However, voters’ attitudes toward Trump
have not yet been shown to “moderate” reactions to environmental political cues that tie
immigration to otherwise unrelated policies.
This study examines the effect a political “immigrant” cue has in increasing polarization
between Trump and non-Trump voters’ views on a government voter registration policy. I seek
to observe whether Trump and non-Trump voters produce contrasting reactions to subtle
environmental cues on immigrants. Trump has made frequent public statements with explicit
and incendiary rhetoric toward immigrants and claims of widespread voter fraud. For example,
Trump falsely claimed he lost the popular vote in the 2016 presidential election because 3 to 5
million undocumented immigrants fraudulently cast votes for Hillary Clinton (Chamberlain,
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2017). One might therefore reasonably surmise that attitudes on who belongs or who is
welcome in the United States would be emphasized by government-sponsored voter
registration policy, or by multilingual signs outside polling places. Support for government
policies may polarize along lines defined by support for President Trump when the multicultural
impact of those policies is made more obvious to people.
To address these questions, I conduct a survey experiment on a national sample of
American adults in 2019 to examine views toward voter registration. Using Luttig et al. as a
model, I randomly divide subjects into three groups which are conditioned differently before
answering questions. I present two groups with a photo of a sign pointing to a polling place –
one group sees a sign that says “vote here” in English-only, and the other, our test group, sees a
multilingual “vote here” sign in English, Spanish and Mandarin. A third group sees no picture
and serves as a control group. All respondents are then asked the same set of questions about
their attitudes toward government programs to help register voters. The questions do not
mention immigrants or immigration, nor do they make reference to the picture. I measure the
effect of the multilingual immigrant cue on attitudes toward voter registration programs in
comparison to the English-only and control group, and then observe potential differences in
reactions between Trump voters and non-Trump voters.
My hypotheses on the different reactions of Trump and non-Trump voters to an
immigrant political cue are as follows:

•

Hypothesis 1: Trump supporters, after viewing a multilingual “immigrant” cue -- contrasted
with an English-only cue and constant group– will (a) increase opposition to government
programs designed to help register voters, (b) increase feelings of anger toward a voter
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registration program, and (c) increase feelings of blame toward individuals who are in
danger of losing their right to vote.

•

Hypothesis 2: Trump opponents, after viewing a multilingual “immigrant” cue will (a)
increase support for a government program designed to help register voters, (b) decrease
feelings of anger toward a government voter registration program, and (c) decrease feelings
of blame toward individuals who are in danger of losing their right to vote.

I find substantial support for my hypotheses that Trump voters and non-Trump voters,
when presented with an immigrant political cue, become increasingly polarized toward
government voter registration programs. In contrast to non-Trump voters, I observe that Trump
voters in all conditions are already strongly opposed, and feel angry about, government
programs to help register voters. Additionally, my results show Trump voters express increasing
opposition and feelings of anger, while non-Trump voters express increasing support and
decreased feelings of anger toward government voter registration programs after being
presented with a multilingual immigrant cue. Results on feelings of blame toward individuals
who are in danger of losing their right to vote for their own circumstances are inconclusive.
LITERATURE REVIEW
My research is intended to contribute to a growing body of scholarship connecting
views on race and immigration of voters to public opinion and behavior. Some methods used to
measure racial resentment, such as political cues, were implemented in other areas of political
science research prior to their application in the 2016 election, or on race issues generally.
Political cues are used in tandem with public opinion questions that are asked in a way that
highlights respondents’ political biases without the respondent’s awareness. In one example,
Malka & Lelkes use political cues to study the propensity of respondents to accept or reject
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ideas, attitudes and beliefs based on one’s conservative or liberal identity. The authors gave
respondents questions about their opinions on specific policies that were first framed with an
ideological cue such as telling respondents “liberals/conservatives oppose X policy.” Results are
then compared with a study that asked the same questions, but without “priming” through
ideological cue. The authors observe a very strong tendency for respondents to conform with
their ideological identity with the addition of the cues. (Malka & Lelkes 2011) This tool has
been used in racial resentment research in the 2016 election as well. In the model for this
study, Luttig, et al. use a racial political cue – a photo of a man standing in front of a house. In
one treatment, respondents see a Black male, and in the other a white male to compare
subjects’ reactions to a foreclosure assistance policy. They find Trump and Clinton voters
become much more polarized after having viewed the picture of the Black male (Luttig, et al.
2017).
Also relevant to this study is prior research on discrepancies in perceptions in election
integrity in the United States between ideological, partisan or racial groups. In “The
Racialization of Electoral Fairness in the 2008 and 2012 United States Presidential Elections,”
Jacob Appleby & Christopher Federico find that Whites were less likely to trust the outcome of
the 2008 and 2012 elections -- contests where Barack Obama, the first Black president, was on
the ballot -- if they also reported increased racial resentment and endorsement of stereotypes.
They found the effect was stronger among White Republican voters who viewed the result as
unwelcome. (Appleby & Federico 2017) Trump voters are overwhelmingly White, and most
found the election of Barack Obama unwelcome. This became all the more salient when Trump
and his supporters’ pushes to overturn the results of the 2020 election based on largely false
rhetoric around election integrity culminated in the events of January 6, in which a group of
Trump supporters invaded the US Capitol (Baker 2021).
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In “Why Can’t We Agree on ID? Partisanship, Perceptions of Fraud, and Public Support
for Voter Identification Laws,” John Kane finds that partisan identity with the Republican Party is
highly predictive of public support for strict voter ID laws. Moreover, Kane finds two
“asymmetries” between respondents who report identification with the Republican and
Democratic parties. First, Kane finds that when Republican respondents discover even an
insignificant degree of voter fraud, support for voter ID laws increases. However, Republican
respondents’ views do not change when they are told that voter ID laws are used strategically to
benefit a particular political party. Conversely, Democratic respondents’ support for voter ID
laws remains largely unchanged when confronted with news about possible voter fraud, but
support for voter ID laws becomes contingent upon which political party stands to benefit. In
other words, Kane finds that Democrats are more concerned with the strategic use of voter ID
laws by Republicans than to prevent voter fraud. (Kane 2017)
Distrust in election integrity on the ideological right also results in increased support for
policies ostensibly intended to protect against voter fraud, according to some authors. In “The
Foundations of Public Opinion on Voter ID Laws: Political Predispositions, Racial Resentment,
and Information Effects,” David C Wilson and Paul R Brewer find so-called “political
predispositions” such as one’s own ideology, party ID and racial attitudes, influence
respondents’ support for voter ID laws. Additionally, they observe a “polarizing” effect between
liberals and conservatives – an effect that reliably intensifies for those more familiarized with
the policy. (Wilson & Brewer 2013)
Prior research on white resentment toward immigrants, and in particular Latino
immigrants, is relevant to this research as well. Ramirez and Peterson argue in Ignored Racism
that White animus toward Latinos that some Americans express anti-Latino sentiment through
beliefs about Latinos’ inability to assimilate to “Anglo-American” norms. These beliefs, held
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largely by White Americans, explain in part support for Trump in the 2016 election, as well as
support for anti-immigrant Republican candidates in congressional elections. (Ramirez &
Peterson 2020)
Adriano Udani and David Kimball authored two papers that connect immigrant
resentment to support for voting restriction laws. In the first, “Making American Elections Great
Again: Immigrant Resentment, Elite Rhetoric and Public Support for Voter Identification
Restrictions,” Udani and Kimball observe a strong relationship between voter identification
restrictions like voter ID laws and resentment toward immigrants. This “immigrationalization”
of voter identification restriction means views on immigration predict public support for such
policies. In the second paper, “Immigrant Resentment and Voter Fraud Beliefs in the U.S.
Electorate,” Udani and Kimball argue that immigrant resentment has a strong relationship to
voter fraud beliefs. Respondents who believe voter fraud is widespread are more likely to
believe immigrants pose a hostile threat, and in fact such beliefs “nourish” public beliefs about
voter fraud.
In summary, existing research suggests that, when primed by a picture that contains a
political racial cue, Trump and Clinton voters become more divided in their opinions to
government programs designed to help Americans with foreclosures. This suggests that when
voters are conditioned to think of a policy through the lens of race, they become even more
polarized. Authors have also measured immigrant animus using questions similar to Kinder &
Sanders’ racial resentment questions, and found that, similar to racial resentment, immigrant
animus is strongly associated with opposition to policies intended to expand access to voting in
the US. In this paper I attempt to apply the racial cue methodology in Luttig, et al. to measure
how feelings on voter registration policy change when respondents are conditioned to view the
policy through an immigration lens. I hypothesize that polarization on feelings about a
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government policy intended to register more voters between Trump and non-Trump voters will
increase when respondents are presented with an immigration political cue.
DATA & METHODOLOGY
In this study I use questions from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
post-election survey, a nationally representative study with 1000+ respondents on a wide
variety of subjects. The purpose of the survey is to ask respondents about their support for a
government-run voter registration program.
Similar to Luttig, et al., this study includes a series of pictures containing political cues
intended to elicit a conditioned response from some respondents’ answers to the follow-up
questions described below. Subjects are randomly assigned into 3 categories, each of which
with a different condition. These conditions will serve as one of the independent variables in
this study. A constant group of roughly 1/3 of subjects, coded as “1,” sees no picture before
answering questions. The remaining 2/3 will see one of two pictures before answering a set of
questions. The “English-only” cohort, coded as “2,” will see a sign pointing toward a polling
place that reads “Vote Here” in English only. The “multilingual” cohort, coded as a “3,” will see a
picture of a “Vote Here” sign in English, Spanish and Mandarin. The treatment in the pictures is
quite subtle – no images of the voters are manipulated, and the only difference between the
pictures is the language used on the sign – all other elements remain consistent. See Figure 1
for the images used in this study.
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FIGURE 1

1)

Treatments for Voter Registration Experiment

CONSTANT (no picture)

2)

3)
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The 2018 CCES post-election survey then asks subjects a series of follow-up
thermometer-style opinion questions about various aspects of voter registration policy,
modeled after those used by Luttig, et al. These three questions probe subjects’ views and
feelings on a government voter registration program, and do not reference immigration,
immigrants or the contents of the picture.
I use in this study Question STL406, heretofore referred to as HELP, to test hypotheses
H1a and H2a. The question is presented as follows:
“Recently there have been proposals for the government to help people who are having
trouble with their voter registration and may lose their right to vote. Some people think
the government should intervene while others think that these people should figure out
how to register on their own and the government should stay out of it. How about you,
would you support or oppose a program to help people register to vote?”

Respondents report their answer using a 7-point feeling thermometer from “Strongly Oppose”
to “Strongly Support.” Answers were coded on a scale from 1 to 7, with 7 indicating strong
support for the registration program. Answers to HELP run so that feelings of opposition toward
government voter registration policy score lower, and favorable responses score higher. In this
case, verification of my hypotheses would require a negative statistical relationship to Trump
voters, and a positive relationship with non-Trump voters, whereas the next two questions
would require the opposite statistical relationship.
I use Question STL407, heretofore referred to as ANGRY, in this study to test hypotheses
H1b and H2b. The question is presented as follows:

“Some people are angry that such people might get assistance from the government.
What about you, how angry does the idea of government voter registration assistance
make you?”
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Respondents are again asked to submit answers via 100-point feeling thermometer from “least
angry” to “most angry.” Respondents who give higher scores have more feelings of anger
toward government voter registration assistance.
I use Question STL408, heretofore referred to as BLAME, in this study to test hypotheses
H1c and H2c. The question is presented as follows:

“How much are the individuals in danger of losing their right to vote to blame for their
situation?”

Subjects are asked to respond with a similar thermometer, from 0 (individual least to blame) to
100 (individual most to blame). Subjects who mark higher scores believe that the individual in
danger of losing voting rights is most to blame for their situation, compared to other potential
factors. Subjects with lower scores believe individuals are less to blame for their circumstances.
I observe differences in responses between the control groups and test group on
answers to the above questions and examine how responses in the test group vary under the
conditions between Trump and non-Trump voters. CC18_317, a variable in the CCES 2018 postElection Survey, asks respondents who they voted for in the 2016 election, giving them the
choice between Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, “Someone else,” “I did not cast a vote for
president,” “I don’t recall”, and “wasn’t asked.” I isolate Trump voters from other categories by
recoding Trump voters as “1,” and all other answers, i.e. non-Trump voters, as “0”. The new
variable, vtrump will serve as the control variable which I then use to compare answers to the
follow-up questions with support for Trump. I also recode CC18_317 to create vclinton, a
variable that separates Hillary Clinton voters and non-Hillary Clinton voters, to test whether
feelings toward Clinton moderate the effect of immigrant cues.
RESULTS
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To test whether differences in Trump and non-Trump voters’ responses under the
immigrant cue condition were the direct result of voters’ opinions of Trump, I examine three
interactive regression models. Sampling weights are applied to the survey data for all analyses
reported here. I measure the potential discrepancy in the effect between conditioned groups,
on answers to HELP, ANGRY and BLAME when they interact with vtrump, heretofore referred to
as Trump Voters. The results of the multilingual condition in HELP, opposition to voter
registration assistance, and ANGRY, anger toward voter registration assistance, were statistically
significant, and show substantial support for my hypotheses. The results of BLAME, blaming
individuals for endangerment of losing their right to vote, were not statistically significant.
Table 2 outlines the results of the interactive regressions I conducted.
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Coefficient

Standard Error

HELP Baseline

-2.104

.235

“

English-Only

-0.0565

.332

“

Multilingual

-.486

.319

ANGRY Baseline

30.653

3.506

“

English-Only

3.360

4.979

“

Multilingual

6.746

4.793

BLAME Baseline

37.932

3.579

TABLE 2

“

English-Only

8.377

5.080

“

Multilingual

5.952

4.892

One contextual point relevant to this study is the overwhelmingly unfavorable attitudes
amongst all surveyed Trump voters toward government policies to expand voter registration. In
the HELP regression, I observe a strong negative relationship with Trump voters under all three
conditions. A -2.1 coefficient shows a relatively strong effect of Trump Voters on responses to
HELP in the direction of my H1 hypothesis. In the absence of a photographic cue, support for the
voter registration policy is more than 2 points lower for Trump voters than for non-Trump voters
-- a large difference on a 6-point scale. Moreover, the relationship between HELP and the
Trump Voters baseline is highly statistically significant -- I observe a t-ratio of -8.97 and a P-value
of 0.0. These results demonstrate a strong relationship between the choice to vote for Trump
and strong opposition to government programs to help individuals register to vote.
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I find similar results on Trump voters’ feelings of anger toward voter registration
programs. I find a strong relationship in the direction of my H1 hypothesis between Trump
voters under all conditions and responses to ANGRY. On a scale of 100, the Trump Voters
baseline coefficient of 30.65 shows an enormous positive effect on ANGRY, and high statistical
significance with a t-ratio and P-value of 8.74 and 0.0, respectively. These results show a strong
relationship between the choice to vote for Trump in 2016 and increased feelings of anger
toward voter registration assistance. Trump voters are therefore significantly more angry about
voter registration programs than non-Trump voters.
In the BLAME regression, I again find a strong relationship in the direction of my H1
hypothesis with Trump voters under all conditions. I observe another large positive effect with
the Trump Supporter baseline – a coefficient of 37.93 – and high statistical significance w a tratio and P-value of 10.6 and 0.0, respectively. Trump voters are therefore considerably more
likely to blame individuals for their own circumstances if they are in danger of losing their right
to vote, by 38 points on a 100 scale.
The interaction of voting for Trump and the experimental treatments also produce some
interesting results. Although the results of my analysis can be withdrawn using the above
regression results, the M-Table below displays results of the regressions in a more legible format
for the purposes of this study. The first column denotes the condition respondents viewed. “1”
is the constant, or the group who say no picture; “2” is the English-only condition; and “3” is the
multilingual condition. Under the Trump Voters column, “0” refers to non-Trump voters, and
“1” refers to Trump voters. I compare results in the “expected support” column to determine
what effect each condition had on Trump and non-Trump voters.
Table 3.1 below reorganizes and displays results of the M-Table for the HELP regression.
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TABLE 3.1

Trump voter

Expected support

Baseline

No

5.755

Yes

3.650

No

5.958

Yes

3.797

No

6.102

Yes

3.512

English-Only

Multilingual

The results of the HELP regression show some support for my hypotheses. First, Trump
voters’ scores in all three conditions on HELP are lower than non-Trump voters, a correlation in
the direction of H1. Second, Trump voters in the constant, English-only and multilingual
conditions scored a 3.650, 3.797, and 3.512 respectively, where non-Trump voters scored 5.755,
5.958 and 6.102, respectively. I observe an increased polarization under the multilingual
condition between Trump and non-Trump voters, with a difference of 2.105 in the constant and
2.161 in the English-only, compared to 2.59 in the multilingual group – a net effect of 0.485 and
0.429 respectively. Support for the voter registration policy increased among non-Trump voters
in the multilingual condition, but support for the program decreased among Trump voters in the
multilingual condition. These results show an increase in polarization between Trump and nonTrump voters under the multilingual condition on their support for government programs to
help register voters.
Table 3.2 displays results of the M-table for the ANGRY regression is below.
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TABLE 3.2

Trump voter

Expected support

Baseline

No

19.838

Yes

50.492

No

16.105

Yes

50.119

No

13.141

Yes

50.540

English-Only

Multilingual

The results of the ANGRY regression show some support for my hypotheses. In the
second model we observe a significant interaction between non-Trump voters and the
multilingual cue is stronger still, with a t-ratio of -2.12, and a P-value of .034. These results also
support my hypotheses. First, anger among Trump voters is much higher than among nonTrump voters, and relatively constant, in all three conditions, a pattern that runs in the direction
of H1. Trump voters’ responses in the expected value column under the constant, English-only
and multilingual conditions are 50.5, 50.1, and 50.5, respectively, compared to non-Trump
voters’ scores of 19.8, 16.1 and 13.1 respectively. This divide in scores between Trump and nonTrump voters -- 30.654, 34.006 and 37.399, respectively – demonstrates a widening polarization
between voters’ condition -- 3.393 points higher than the English-only condition, and 6.745
points higher than the constant. In this case the polarization is driven by lessened anger among
non-Trump voters in the two treatment conditions. The immigrant political cue polarized Trump
and non-Trump voters significantly when they were asked to report feelings of anger toward
government programs to help register voters. Trump voters were slightly more angry, and nonTrump voters were significantly less angry, when presented with a subtle immigrant cue.
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Table 3.3 displays the results of the M-table for the BLAME regression.

TABLE 3.3

Trump voter

Expected support

Baseline

No

33.683

Yes

71.616

No

30.847

Yes

77.156

No

32.022

Yes

75.906

English-Only

Multilingual

Results in the BLAME regression provide weaker support for my hypotheses. The Mtable above shows values under the “expected support” column that run in the direction of H1.
The interactions between the treatment conditions and Trump voters are not statistically
significant. The degree to which Trump voters blame individuals for not being registered to vote
for the control group, English-only and multilingual conditions are 71.6, 77.2 and 75.9,
compared to non-Trump voters’ values of 33.7, 30.8 and 32.0, respectively. Responses of Trump
voters under the multilingual condition yielded results 4.29 points higher than the constant
condition – a higher spread than in other regressions in the direction of H2. However, Trump
voters in the multilingual condition yielded results 1.25 points lower than the English-only
condition. In any case, the multilingual condition in the BLAME regression produced a t-ratio of
1.22 and a P-value of 0.244 – which demonstrates a lack of statistical significance. Therefore, I
am unable to establish a relationship between Trump voters in the multilingual condition and
increased feelings of blame toward individuals in danger of losing their right to vote.
The results of the BLAME regression do not support my H2 hypothesis. As noted, nonTrump voters’ responses in the “expected support” column under all 3 conditions are
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significantly lower than Trump voters’ scores, which runs in the direction of H2. Moreover,
responses of non-Trump voters in the multilingual condition yielded lower results than in the
constant treatment, with a difference of 1.661. However, responses of non-Trump voters under
the multilingual condition ran in the opposite direction, 1.175 points higher than the Englishonly treatment. In any case, non-Trump voters under the multilingual condition yielded a t-ratio
of -0.52 and P-value of 0.606, a statistically insignificant result. I was unable to observe a
priming effect of the multilingual cue on non-Trump voters’ feelings of blame toward individuals
in danger of losing their right to vote.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates Trump and non-Trump voters become increasingly polarized on
their support for a government voter registration program and feelings of anger toward the
program when presented with a subtle immigrant cue in a photograph. In both cases, Trump
voters reacted quite subtly to the immigrant cue, while non-Trump voters account for most of
this polarizing effect. Results measuring polarization on feelings of blame toward those in
danger of losing their right to vote were not always statistically significant. Moreover, I found
voters’ feelings toward Donald Trump moderate the effect of the political cue on responses.
The effect of the political cue notwithstanding, Trump voters are deeply opposed to
government policies that help register voters. This is a prior condition important to note to
provide context for my results. Trump supporters are strongly in sync with the president on the
policy of voter registration assistance. Arguably, observing even a subtle effect of the
multilingual condition on answers to voter registration questions is remarkable under these
conditions since discrepancies in views on voter registration between Trump and non-Trump
voters are already “baked in” to a large degree. The political cue used in this study is quite
subtle, and even subtle effects are worth testing and reporting. It is worth noting that political
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rhetoric from President Trump and others that blames immigrants for voter fraud is much more
direct than the treatment in this experiment. One might reasonably argue that these results
suggest actual political rhetoric has a bigger polarizing effect on public opinion.
Additionally, I demonstrate that environmental cues polarize Trump and non-Trump
voters when asked about an issue that Trump has explicitly voiced his opinion on, but that the
larger GOP has not. The GOP is often accused of using policies to limit voter registration for
their own political benefit, but rarely publicly admit that it is their goal. In contrast, Trump has
voiced strong negative views toward government expansion of voter registration, and as
expected, Trump voters expressed similar opposition. This implies yet again that polarization
shown in this study hinges on Trump, and not on other influences.
To conclude, I offer suggestions for future research. First, Similar to Luttig, et al., my
research suggests a possible “sympathy” toward minority and disadvantaged groups amongst
non-Trump voters. We do not know how this is related to feelings toward Trump versus other
factors. Future research could interrogate whether Trump’s incendiary rhetoric toward
immigrants and controversial policies such as “Child Separation” might act as a driver for nonTrump voters to feel sympathy toward immigrants. Research might also include an examination
of voters’ responses to actual statements and tweets the president has made about voting laws
like voting by mail, policies dealing with police conduct, etc. Second, just as this research does
not reveal immigrant sympathy as a driver to oppose Trump, nor does it suggest Trump voters
are driven by feelings of anti-immigrant resentment. More research is needed to observe how
immigrant resentment plays a role in American politics similar to that of racial resentment.
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ABSTRACT:
Overt and blatant racism of the type that was once used to justify Jim Crow laws and
other forms of de facto segregation against Blacks has largely been forced into the margins of
society. However, the reduction of overt racism that casts whites as biologically superior to
Blacks can be easily confused with a reduction of racism in totality. The election and continued
popularity of Donald Trump, a president who has on a number of occasions used racist and antiimmigrant rhetoric in stump speeches and on Twitter, demonstrates that the conversation on
race in the United States is not nearly so simple, and that much more analysis is needed. with
the frequency of appeals to racism and anti-immigrant sentiment in campaigns, many wonder
how well views toward Blacks and immigrants shape voting decisions in our national elections.
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I seek to observe how voters’ feelings of resentment
toward Blacks might continue to serve as a driver of support for Trump beyond the 2016
election. Second, I examine the degree to which animus toward immigrants from Central and
South America acts as a driver to support Trump after 2016, and to vote for Republican
candidates in the 2018 midterms as well. In both cases, I find approval for Trump and support
for GOP candidates in US House, US Senate, and gubernatorial races are strongly associated with
racial and immigrant animus.
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INTRODUCTION
Overt and blatant racism of the type that was once used to justify Jim Crow laws and
other forms of de facto segregation against Blacks has largely been forced into the margins of
society. However, the reduction of overt racism that casts whites as biologically superior to
Blacks can be easily confused with a reduction of racism in totality. The election and continued
popularity of Donald Trump, a president who has on a number of occasions used racist and antiimmigrant rhetoric in stump speeches and on Twitter, demonstrates that the conversation on
race in the United States is not nearly so simple, and that much more analysis is needed. Given
the frequency of these controversial appeals during the campaign, many wonder how views
toward Blacks and immigrants amongst Trump’s voting base might have shaped voting decisions
in national elections. Trump’s voting base remains overwhelmingly white, rural and has a low
level of educational attainment. This is a group that has often been ignored in scholarly
research but has had a profound and unprecedented influence on the American political system
in 2016.
To date, scholars have on multiple occasions connected voters’ feelings of resentment
toward Black Americans to support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election (Sides, et
al., 2019; Ramirez 2020). However, no such scholarship exists connecting racial resentment to
continued support for Trump after 2016. Moreover, scholarship has not yet uncovered a link
between feelings of animus toward other ethnic groups, particularly immigrants from countries
in Central and South America, and support for Trump. This is especially peculiar since Trump’s
most inflammatory and explicit rhetoric is often more frequently directed at immigrants. For
example, Trump announced his candidacy in the 2016 election with a speech in which he called
immigrants murderers and rapists (Phillips, 2017).
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The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I seek to observe how voters’ feelings of
resentment toward Blacks might continue to serve as a driver for support for Trump beyond the
2016 election. Second, I examine the degree to which animus toward immigrants from Central
and South America acts as a driver to support Trump after 2016 as well. I test each of these by
measuring the correlation between variables of resentment and approval for Trump as of 2018,
as well as by measuring voters’ support for GOP candidates in the 2018 midterm elections. In
nearly every case, Republican candidates for US House, US Senate and Governor ran campaigns
in the 2018 election cycle adopted Trump’s rhetoric and policy platforms, and nearly always
praised Trump and avoided criticisms. Trump’s intense popularity amongst Republican voters
meant that any criticisms levied at Trump would almost certainly have resulted in that
candidate’s loss in a primary to a more Trump-friendly candidate. I therefore treat support for
Republican candidates in 2018 as a proxy for Trump approval. The relationship between
support for GOP candidates and racial resentment and immigrant animus then become relevant
and are included as a part of this study. In both cases, I find approval for Trump and support for
GOP candidates in US House, US Senate, and gubernatorial races are strongly associated with
racial and immigrant animus.
LIT REVIEW
Thus far, contemporary racial resentment scholarship has largely been based on the
work of Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders. While the term “racial resentment” was coined in
their 1996 book Divided By Color, Kinder & Sanders presented earlier versions of this
phenomenon, which they referred to as “symbolic racism,” in the 1970s and 80s. Racial
resentment, they argue, is much more subtle and sophisticated, and often far more difficult to
detect than Jim Crow era overt racism. Rather than study increasingly rare forms of blunt and
easily identifiable racism based on imagined biological differences between race groups, Kinder

57

& Sanders describe racial resentment as “… the conjunction of whites’ feelings toward blacks
and their support for American values, especially secularized versions of the Protestant ethic.
(293)” They argue American voters with feelings of racial resentment might believe that Blacks
lack moral values like individualism and hard work, or that Blacks do not try hard enough to
overcome difficulties or that they take what they have not earned. Importantly, they argue
those who express racial resentment feel that these beliefs are central to the white race and
American society at large, and that racial resentment is “… the primary ingredient in white
opinion on racial affairs,” which dominates views of White Americans. As a result, the effect of
racial resentment, in their judgement, is felt across a spectrum of racial policies (Carmines et al.
101).
Kinder & Sanders measure racial resentment using a series of agree versus disagree
style questions. These questions are designed to identify the level of racial resentment in
respondents to the exclusion of other factors. (106) Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment
questions are as follows:
1. Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if
they tried.
2. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
3. Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black
than from a white person.
4. Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
5. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
6. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

These questions do not require whites to openly declare opinions on the inferiority of
Blacks to whites, let alone admit to any degree of overt racism within themselves. Instead, the
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questions subtly “…distinguish between those whites who are generally sympathetic toward
blacks and those who are generally unsympathetic (Kinder & Sanders 106).” The questions in
both cases are intended to withdraw expressions of “…subtle hostility without seeming to
offend the democratic values that most subjects would feel bound to support.” (Kinder &
Sanders 106) Kinder and Sanders argue the impact of racial resentment is “unequaled” by any
other factor in shaping voters’ views on “racialized” policies like affirmative action, and is more
powerful than self-interest, support for limited government, ideology, or demographic factors
like age, region, gender, etc. (Carmines 100).
Also crucial to this research, Donald Kinder and Thomas Nelson demonstrated in 1996
that, while it is not the only driver of public opinion, group-centrism is an “elemental”
component in shaping American public opinion on a diverse range of issues. Most people
choose policy preferences based not on ideological considerations or education, but on how
they feel about the groups who are targeted by those policies. Group-centric thought
“…functions as an efficient heuristic that conveniently reduces the complexity of policy politics
to a simple judgmental standard. (1056)” Moreover, the degree to which group-centrism
influences public opinion in many cases is subject to how an issue or policy is framed by elites,
and the multiple interpretations that can be derived from the same policies. But Nelson &
Kinder argue that group-centrism plays a more prominent role in public opinion when political
elites intentionally frame an issue in a way that highlights differences, either real or perceived,
between groups (1056-57). Group identity is multifaceted and can manifest in loyalty toward or
opposition to a specific candidate or political group. As my research will show, a given group’s
approval or disapproval of Trump can be highly salient in contemporary American politics.
Moreover, group-centrism in the form of party identification remains the strongest influence on
public opinion.

59

Many scholars since the publication of Divided by Color have reaffirmed and added to
the merits of racial resentment. The group-centric nature of public opinion, particularly racial
group identity, is central to contemporary racial resentment measurements, and remains
especially important when their model is applied to Trump voters. Sides, et al., and other
scholars used Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment model to show how white racial group
identity and group-based values led to support for Donald Trump in the 2016 election (Sides, et
al. 2018). Kimball, et al. observe that well-reported increases in partisanship and political
polarization in the American electorate can be directly attributed to group attitudes and
outperform ideological positions in explanations of choice for president in the 2016 election.
(170)
Nelson & Kinder’s second observation relevant to my research is that political elites
amplify group-centrism through issue framing. Trump has faced ample accusations of framing
issues under a rubric of white identity politics, including referring to Mexican and South
American immigrants as “rapists,” referring to developing nations as “shithole countries,” and
others (Burns, 2015; Vitali, et al., 2018). By and large, political elites in the GOP have served
Trump by amplifying his message, making it all the more powerful (Colvin, 2021). If Nelson &
Kinder’s observation is correct, Trump’s framing has served to amplify white group identity,
making group-centrism in public opinion all the more important in the 2016, 2018 and 2020
elections.
Other scholars have examined the intersection between racial resentment and other
demographic factors such as the widening “education gap” between Trump and non-Trump
voters, in which non-college educated whites supported Trump in 2016 far more than collegeeducated whites. Schaffner et al. argue that the intensification of economic divides made
Trump’s populist economic platform more attractive to white working-class voters. Other
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scholars like Bartels, who claim the economy tends to be the most important factor in deciding
elections, would likely emphasize economic struggles over other factors. Schaffner, et al. grant
Bartels and others that economic concerns amongst non-college educated whites was indeed
“part of the story.” (12-13)
However, Schaffner et al. claim racism and sexism acted as a stronger driver of support
or opposition to Trump, and more thoroughly explained the so-called “white education gap,”
where GOP voters are increasingly likely to have a lower level of educational attainment than
Democratic voters. They claim Trump’s willingness to make explicitly racist “birtherism”
remarks about the first African American President (Serwer, 2020), and to make overtly sexist
remarks about the first major female candidate for president (White, 2015), was appealing to
less educated whites, and repellant to more educated whites. (13-15) Schaffner et al. argue
Trump’s appeal to racism and sexism accounts for 2/3rds of the education gap amongst white
voters. Unsurprisingly, group-centrism, and particularly party identification, again plays a
powerful role in this equation as well (11).
While scholarship on racial resentment dates back to the mid-1990s, parallel scholarship
on animus towards immigrants is not as robust. Still, some scholarship has been written in the
absence of an immigrant animus model as well-regarded as Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment
studies. Ramirez and Peterson argue that some Americans express anti-Latino sentiment caused
by beliefs about Latinos’ inability to assimilate to “Anglo-American” norms. These beliefs, held
largely by White Americans, partially explain support for Trump in the 2016 election, as well as
support for anti-immigrant Republican candidates in congressional elections. (Ramirez &
Peterson 2020)
Adriano Udani & David Kimball authored two papers adding to immigrant animus
research. The first, “Making American Elections Great Again: Immigrant Resentment, Elite
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Rhetoric and Public Support for Voter Identification Restrictions,” they observe a strong
relationship between public support for voter identification restrictions like voter ID laws and
animus toward immigrants. This “immigrationalization” of voter identification restriction means
views on immigration predict public support for such policies. (2018a). In the second paper,
“Immigrant Resentment and Voter Fraud Beliefs in the U.S. Electorate,” Udani & Kimball argue
that immigrant animus has a strong relationship to voter fraud beliefs. They find respondents
who believe immigrants pose a hostile threat are more likely to believe that voter fraud is
widespread, and in fact such beliefs “nourish” public beliefs about voter fraud. (2018b)
My hypotheses on the relationship between support for Trump and racial and
immigrant animus are as follows:

•

Hypothesis 1: When controlling for party ID, race, gender, education and age, racial
resentment and immigrant animus have a positive statistical association with approval for
Trump as President.

•

Hypothesis 2: When controlling for party ID, race, gender, education and age, racial
resentment and immigrant animus have a positive statistical association with one’s choice
for the Republican candidate for their representative in the United States Senate.

•

Hypothesis 3: When controlling for party ID, race, gender, education and age, racial
resentment and immigrant animus have a positive statistical association with one’s choice
for the Republican candidate for their representative in the United States House of
Representatives.

•

Hypothesis 4: When controlling for party ID, race, gender, education and age, racial
resentment and immigrant animus have a positive statistical association with one’s choice
for the Republican candidate for Governor of their state.
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ROAD MAP
This paper is organized as follows: First I describe the methodology used to answer the
above questions. I briefly summarize the basic components of the dataset relevant to this
study, and the quantitative methods I use to analyze it. I then describe in detail the variables in
this data relevant to answering the questions above, including independent, dependent and
control variables. I explain why each variable is useful to my analysis and explain changes I
made in order to facilitate this analysis. These changes include recodes, folding multiple
variables into new master variables, etc. in order to streamline and simplify my analysis. Next, I
describe in detail the results of my data analysis in a step-by-step fashion. Finally, I discuss the
implications of my analysis, and conclude with suggestions for future research.
METHODOLOGY
I test my hypotheses using a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Logistic
Regressions. All regressions will include two important independent variables -- the first is a
measure of racial resentment, and the second immigrant animus. The first set of regressions
uses multivariate dependent variables that measure respondents’ approval rating for Trump as
president and require OLS regressions to observe relationships. In three additional sets of
models, I use dependent variables that display respondents’ partisan choice for various highlevel national political offices. These bivariate variables, in which respondents are categorized in
two groups – Republican and non-Republican voters – require logistic regressions to measure
relationships. I also control for important factors like partisan identification, which is highly
influential, and demographic factors such as race, gender, education and age. After each
regression model, I report predicted values of the dependent variable for different values or
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changes in the independent variables of interest, making the relationships in my models easier
to observe.
DATA
In this study I use data from the 2018 American National Election Survey (ANES) pilot
study. This data consists of 2,500 subjects whose responses were collected in December 2018.
Subjects were asked to report demographic details such as age, education and race, and political
questions related to partisan affiliation and presidential approval. They were also asked to
respond to four of Kinder and Sanders’ six racial resentment questions, and to a set of questions
measuring views on illegal immigration. I use these questions to compare levels of racial and
anti-immigrant animus, respectively, with questions asking respondents’ support and approval
for Trump, and questions on support for other GOP politicians in the 2018 midterm election. I
also use weights included in the data set, as recommended. Below, I describe each of these
variables in detail.
The first dependent variable for this study asks, “Do you approve, disapprove, or neither
approve nor disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president.”
Respondents answer on a 7-point thermometer scale from (1) “approve extremely strongly” to
(7) “Disapprove extremely strongly.” In other words, lower scores indicate increased approval
for President Trump. This variable will serve as the primary measure on feelings toward Donald
Trump in this study.
As part of this study, I also use voters’ support for GOP candidates as a proxy for Trump
support in the 2018 election cycle. The 2018 ANES Pilot Study has dependent variables
measuring partisan choices for Senate, House of Representatives and Governor. These measure
respondents’ political party of choice when they cast their vote for various political leaders. A
series of questions on the 2018 ANES ask respondents which party they voted for in contests for
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US Senate, US House of Representatives and Governor, respectively. For the House and
Governor contests the 2018 ANES survey asked subjects on a 3-point scale whether they voted
in the 2018 midterms for a representative for US House and Governor, respectively, that was
either (1) “Democrat,” (2) “Republican,” or (3) “something else.” For the Senate contest
respondents answered on a 4-point scale whether they voted in the 2018 midterms for a US
Senator that was either (1) “Democrat,” (2) “Republican,” (3) “another party,” or (4) “two
different parties. I recode these into bivariate variables that change Republicans to a “1” score
and Democrats to a “0,” while the few respondents who voted for “something else” or “another
party” are dropped. Given the GOP’s nearly unwavering support of the President throughout his
term, these variables serve as a substitute for voter support for Trump in 2018.
Combined scores of four questions measuring racial resentment in the ANES serve as
one of the primary independent variables in this study. The racial resentment questions which
originate in Divided by Color have been used these questions to measure a more subtle form of
“symbolic” or “cultural” racism that has replaced the Jim Crow era biological racism. Two of
Kinder & Sanders’ questions were removed to ensure other variables like individualism or
patriotism do not unintentionally influence results.
The four questions are as follows:
1. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
2. Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
3. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Each question is answered on a 5-point scale from “Agree Strongly” to “Disagree
Strongly,” and half the questions run in opposite directions from the others. “Disagree strongly”
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answers to questions 1 and 4 suggest high racial resentment, while the reverse, “Agree
Strongly,” is true for questions 2 and 3. I recode questions 1 and 4 to run in the same causal
direction as 2 and 3, and I average these four variables to create a single racial resentment scale.
I rescale the resentment variable to range from 0 to 1 so that higher scores indicate more racial
resentment amongst respondents. I expect that respondents with higher levels of racial
resentment are more likely to approve of President Trump’s job performance and are more
likely to vote for Republican candidates.
Similar to Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment questions, which serve as a popular
measure of animus toward Blacks, measuring immigrant animus requires a parallel set of
questions designed to measure animus toward immigrant groups. The ANES has a series of four
questions designed for this purpose. The first is as follows:
1. On balance, do you think having an increasing number of people of many
different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in the United States makes this
country a better place to live, a worse place to live, or does it make no
difference?
On a 7-point scale, respondents answer (1) “A lot better,” (2) “Moderately better,” (3)
“A little better,” (4) “No difference,” (5) “A little worse,” (6) Moderately worse, or (7) “A lot
worse.” The second question is as follows:
2. Does illegal immigration increase, decrease, or have no effect on the crime
rate in the U.S.?
On a 7-point scale, respondents answer (1) “Increase a lot,” (2) “Increase a moderate
amount,” (3) “Increase a little,” (4) “No effect,” (5) “Decrease a little,” (6) “Decrease a moderate
amount,” or “Decrease a lot.” The third and fourth questions are as follows:
3. Is illegal immigration good, bad, or neither good nor bad for the quality of
local public education?
4. Is illegal immigration good, bad, or neither good nor bad for the national
economy?
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On a 7-point scale, respondents answer both questions (1) “Very good,” (2) “Moderately
good,” (3) “A little good,” (4) “Neither good nor bad,” (5) “A little bad,” (6) “Moderately Bad,” or
(7) “Very bad.” Three of these variables run in the same direction, such that lower scores signal
less immigrant animus, and higher scores indicate more negative views. Lower scores on the
question about crime mean higher levels of animus, and higher scores signal less animus.
Therefore, I recode the crime variable so it runs in the same direction as the other 3 questions,
and combine all four into a new variable. This variable is also rescaled to range from 0 to 1, with
higher values indicating more negative views toward illegal immigrants. This variable serves as
another important independent variable measuring attitudes toward illegal immigrants. I
expect voters with more negative views toward illegal immigrants will be more supportive of
Donald Trump as President, and to be more supportive of Republican candidates in US House,
US Senate and Gubernatorial races.
In order to isolate the relevant variables in this study, I control for multiple demographic
factors. The first of which is party identification – agreed upon by many scholars as one of the
most predictive variables in American’s voting habits. In this case I use an ANES variable that
measures respondents on a 7-point scale to indicate their level of party identification. A “-7”
score indicates a respondent did not answer, a “1” score signifies “Strong Democrat,” “2” is “Not
very strong Democrat,” “3” is “Independent Closer to a Democrat,” “4” is “Independent,” “5” is
“Independent closer to a Republican,” “6” is “Not very strong Republican,” and “7” is “Strong
Republican.” I recode this variable to fit the needs of this study. First, I drop respondents who
did not answer the question. Then I create a measure of party ID on a 0 to 1 point scale, 0 is
“Strong Democrat,” .1667 is “Not very strong Democrat,” .333 is “Independent Closer to a
Democrat,” .5 is “Independent,” .667 is “Independent closer to a Republican,” .8333 is “Not very
strong Republican,” and “1” is “Strong Republican.” I use this new variable, pi1, to control for
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party identification in my regression analyses. Party identification remains the strongest
influence on public opinion in American politics. It is a useful control in this study because, if
after controlling for party ID I still detect an impact of racial and immigrant animus on support
for Trump and the GOP, we know the effect of these two variables remains strong.
I also control for various demographic information of respondents that might otherwise
cloud results. This study, where race is highly salient, first requires controlling for racial
characteristics of respondents. The ANES contains race, a variable asking respondents to report
their racial category on a 7-point scale. A score of -7 indicates no answer from respondents, 1 is
“White,” 2 is “Black,” 3 is “Hispanic,” 4 is “Asian,” 5 is “Native American.” 6 is “Mixed,” and 7 is
“Other.” I recode race and create a new variable that drops respondents who did not answer
and isolates white respondents from all others. In the new variable, white, a 1 score still
signifies a white respondent, while a 0 score signifies all other racial categories. On average, I
expect whites to hold stronger anti-immigrant views, and to be more supportive of Trump as
President than non-whites.
I control for other demographic measurements as well. I recoded the variable gender in
the ANES, which asks respondents their sex. The new variable, Men, separates “male,” coded as
1, from “female,” recoded as 0. Additionally, I control for education. The variable educ in the
ANES asks respondents on a 6-point scale their current level of educational attainment. A 1score signifies a “No HS [High School]” answer, 2 signifies “High School graduate,” 3 means a
respondent has had “some college” but did not graduate, 4 means attainment of a “2-year”
college degree, 5 means attainment of a “4-year” degree, and 6 means a respondent has had at
least some “Post-grad” school education. Finally, I control for age. Respondents to the ANES
are asked to report their birthyear, which provides a reliable variable for subjects’ age.
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TABLE 1
Party
Identification
Racial
Resentment
Immigrant
Animus
Race
Sex
Education
Age

Trump Approval
coef. -3.113
S.E. (0.112)
-2.030
(0.144)
-2.185
(0.184)
-0.084
(0.066)
-0.189
(0.059)
0.055
(0.02)
-0.003
(.002)

Partisan Choice
for US Senate
1255.818
(867.855)
4.623
(2.909)
33.728
(39.162)
1.548
(0.610)
1.609
(0.479)
0.868
(0.0784)
1.0
(0.009)

Partisan Choice
for US House
3425.844
(2430.383)
8.170
(4.975)
103.956
(126.695)
1.311
(0.524)
1.680
(0.486)
0.768
(0.071)
0.996
(0.009)

FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

FIGURE 3

FIGURE 4
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Partisan Choice
for Governor
299.7
(158.427)
2.440
(1.333)
125.729
(113.397)
1.331
(0.470)
1.186
(0.317)
0.96
(0.08)
0.998
(0.008)

RESULTS
I test my results through a series of logistic and linear regression analyses, followed by
additional calculations that further illustrate my results. The first set of analyses measures the
potential correlation between feelings of animus toward racial and immigrant groups and one’s
level of approval toward President Trump. To support my hypothesis, I would need to observe a
negative correlation between approval for Trump and racial resentment even when controlling
for other strong factors like political party identification. In other words, I expect to find a
positive correlation between approval for Trump and racial resentment.
The first regression is a statistically significant result examining the association between
approval for Trump and racial and immigrant animus. Table 1 displays the results of the
regression. Consistent with prior research, these results also demonstrate that Party ID has the
strongest association with Trump approval. Given how strong an effect party ID has on Trump
approval, it is remarkable that racial and immigrant animus still have a relatively strong effect
when I control for party ID. A coefficient of -2.0 means that for a 1-unit increase in racial
resentment (going from lowest to highest resentment) increases approval of President Trump by
2 units. This relationship supports my hypothesis that Trump voters are driven to support
Trump after 2016 partially by animus toward Blacks.
This regression also measures the effect of animus toward immigrant groups on
approval for the president. If my hypothesis is correct, I expect to see a similar relationship – a
relationship between increased approval for Trump and increased feelings of animus for
immigrants. Again, I observe a statistically significant result, and the relationship of immigrant
animus is strikingly similar to that of racial resentment. With a coefficient of -2.2, the
relationship between immigrant animus and Trump approval is very similar, and in the same
direction as that of racial resentment. In other words, even when controlling for party ID and
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demographic variables, high racial resentment moves respondents two units toward greater
approval of President Trump, while immigrant animus moves respondents 2.2 units toward
greater approval. Moreover, my research shows men are more likely to approve of president
Trump than women, and approval declines as education increases. Race and age are not
statistically associated with support for Trump after controlling for party ID and attitudes toward
race and immigration.
I observe a 1.1 point shift toward increased approval for President Trump for every 1standard deviation increase in Republican partisanship, a 0.6 shift toward increased approval for
every 1-standard deviation increase in racial resentment, and a 0.5 point shift toward greater
approval of the president with every 1-standard deviation increase in illegal immigrant animus.
This therefore supports my hypothesis that immigrant animus also serves as a driver to support
Trump after 2016. Figure 1 is a coefficient plot that separates each independent variable and
illustrates the strength and direction of the association between Trump approval and each
independent variable.
I find similar results in a series of statistically significant logistical regressions aimed at
examining the relationship between vote choice and feelings of racial resentment and
immigrant animus. I use variables on respondents’ partisan choices for US Senator, US House
Representative and Governor described above, and examine their relationship to racial
resentment and immigrant animus scores. In all cases, I observe again that party ID has a strong
association with selection of a candidate for each of these offices – an unsurprising result, since
we are measuring partisan choice. What is remarkable, however, is that racial and immigrant
animus continue to have an effect on voters’ choices even when controlling for party ID.
The first of these is a statistically significant regression that tests the relationship
between respondents’ partisan choice for US Senator. If my hypothesis is correct, I should
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observe a positive association between Republican voters for US Senate and racial and
immigrant animus measures. As Table 1 shows, unsurprisingly, party identification remains the
strongest variable associated with one’s partisan choice for US Senator. However, even when
controlling for the substantial effect party ID has, the racial resentment odds ratio of 4.62 means
that the odds of voting for a Republican Senate candidate are 4.6 times higher for a voter with
maximum racial resentment than a voter with minimum levels of racial resentment.
The relationship between immigrant animus and respondents’ partisan choice for
Senator is stronger than that of racial resentment. The immigrant animus odds ratio of 33.73
means that moving from minimum to maximum illegal immigrant animus increases the odds of
voting for a Republican Senate candidate by 40. Meanwhile the demographic variables are not
statistically significant predictors of Senate vote choice in 2018.
Expected probability of voting Republican increases by 51 percentage points, going from
strong Democrat to strong Republican. Expected probability of voting Republican increases by 8
percentage points, going from lowest to highest racial resentment score. Expected probability
of voting Republican increases by 22 percentage points, going from lowest to highest immigrant
animus score. Once again partisanship has the strongest relationship with vote choice. Negative
views toward immigrants has a stronger association with vote choice than racial resentment.
Figure 2 is a coefficient plot that illustrates the association between the choice to vote for a
Republican for US Senate and each independent variable.
The second statistically significant logistic regression testing the relationship between
partisan voting habits and racial and immigrant animus examines voters’ partisan choice for US
House in 2018. Table 1 illustrates, the odds ratio of the effect of racial resentment on partisan
choice for House candidate is 8.131, which means Republican voters are 713% more likely to
score higher on this study’s racial resentment measure than Democrats. An odds ratio of 92.24
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means that Republican voters are 9124% more likely to harbor feelings of animus toward
immigrants than Democrats.
Expected probability of voting Republican increases by 51 percentage points, going from
strong Democrat to strong Republican. Expected probability of voting Republican increases by 9
percentage points, going from lowest to highest racial resentment score. Expected probability
of voting Republican increases by 25 percentage points, going from lowest to highest illegal
immigrant animus score. Therefore, even when controlling for party ID, racial and immigrant
animus have a significant effect on voters’ choice to select Republican candidates for US House –
a result that supports my hypothesis. Figure 3 is a coefficient plot that illustrates the association
between the choice to vote for a Republican for US House of Representatives and each
independent variable.
The final statistically significant logistic regression measures the relationship between
racial and immigrant animus and respondents’ choice to support Republican candidates for
governor in their state in the 2018 midterms. Party identification again remains the strongest
variable associated with respondents’ partisan choice for governor. However, racial resentment
and immigrant animus continue to have an association even when controlling for Party ID. As
table 1 illustrates, the odds ratio of the effect of racial resentment on partisan choice for
gubernatorial candidate is 2.44, which means Republican voters are 144% more likely to score
higher on this study’s racial resentment measure than Democrats. An odds ratio of 125.729
means that Republican voters are 12,472% more likely to harbor feelings of animus toward
immigrants than Democrats.
Expected probability of voting Republican increases by 48 percentage points, going from
strong Democrat to strong Republican. Expected probability of voting Republican increases by 6
percentage points, going from lowest to highest racial resentment score. Expected probability
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of voting Republican increases by 42 percentage points, going from lowest to highest illegal
immigrant animus score. Therefore, even when controlling for party ID, racial and immigrant
animus have a significant effect on voters’ choice to select 2018 Republican candidates for
Governor – a result that supports my hypothesis. Figure 4 is a coefficient plot that illustrates the
association between the choice to vote for a Republican for Governor and each independent
variable.
CONCLUSION
In this study I show the association of racial resentment and anti-immigrant attitudes
with approval of President Donald J. Trump in the 2018 election cycle. I find racial resentment
and negative views toward illegal immigrants continue to be strongly associated with approval
of Trump as President two years after the 2016 election. I also show that racial and immigrant
attitudes are strongly associated with respondents’ choice to vote for Republican candidates for
US House, US Senate and Governor. Even after having lost the 2020 election by 7 million votes
(Wasserman 2021), Donald Trump remains the leader of the Republican Party, and therefore
remains highly influential. Most Republican candidates in the 2018 election cycle expressed
profuse loyalty to Trump, had messaging that mirrored Trump’s public statements, and were
rarely critical of actions of the Trump Administration. Therefore, using Republican candidates
for national offices serves as a proxy for Trump support in 2018.
Unsurprisingly, I find party identification remains the strongest association with Trump
approval and voting behavior in 2018. However, in my analyses I still find a strong effect of
racial and immigrant attitudes on Trump approval and vote choice, even when controlling for
party identification. In other words, racial and anti-immigrant animus continues to have
profound influences on electoral politics in the United States.
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Suggestions for additional research might include an examination of changes to racial
and immigrant animus over time. We do not yet know if Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric on race
and immigration increased animus, or further polarized the major party coalitions based on
views toward race and immigration.

75

Carmines, Edward G., Paul M. Sniderman, and Beth C. Easter. 2011. “On the Meaning,
Measurement, and Implications of Racial Resentment.” The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science634(1): 98–116.
Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic
Ideals. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Nelson, Thomas E., and Donald R. Kinder. 1996. “Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American
Public Opinion.” The Journal of Politics 58(4): 1055–78. doi: 10.2307/2960149.
Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2019. Identity Crisis: the 2016 Presidential
Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Kimball, David C., Joseph Anthony, and Tyler Chance. 2018. “Political Identity and Party
Polarization in the American Electorate.” In The State of the Parties, 8th ed. eds. John C.
Green, Daniel J. Coffey, and David B. Cohen. Boulder, CA: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 169184.
Udani, Adriano and David C. Kimball (2018b). “Immigrant Resentment and Voter Fraud Beliefs in
the US Electorate”. In: American Politics Research 46.3, pp. 402–433.
Udani, Adriano and David C Kimball (2018a). ““Making American Elections Great Again:
Immigrant Resentment, Elite Rhetoric and Public Support for Voter Identification
Restrictions”. In: Working Paper.
Ramirez, Mark D., and Peterson David A M. 2020. Ignored Racism: White Animus toward Latinos.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Phillips, Amber. 2017. “‘They’re Rapists.’ President Trump’s Campaign Launch Speech Two Years
Later, Annotated.” Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/06/16/theyre-rapists-presidents-trump-campaign-launch-speech-twoyears-later-annotated/ (April 10, 2021).
Wasserman, David et al. “2020 Popular Vote Tracker.” The Cook Political Report.
https://cookpolitical.com/2020-national-popular-vote-tracker (April 11, 2021).
Burns, Alexander. 2015. “Choice Words From Donald Trump, Presidential Candidate.” The New
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/06/16/choice-wordsfrom-donald-trump-presidential-candidate/ (April 12, 2021).
Vitali, Ali, Kasie Hunt, and Frank Thorp V. 2018. “Trump Referred to Haiti and African Nations as
'Shithole' Countries.” NBCNews.com. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/whitehouse/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946 (April 12, 2021).
Colvin, Jill. 2021. “Trump Addresses GOP as Power to Shape National Debate Wanes.” AP NEWS.
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-television-media-social-media-mar-a-lago15475effad776332890300bcb2b35bde (April 12, 2021).
Serwer, Adam. 2020. “Birtherism of a Nation.” The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/birtherism-and-trump/610978/
(April 12, 2021).
White, Daniel. 2015. “Donald Trump Calls Clinton's Bathroom Break 'Disgusting'.” Time.
https://time.com/4158303/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-disgusting-schlonged/ (April
12, 2021).

76

CHAPTER 4:
Changes in the Relationship Between Partisan Identification and Racial and Immigrant Animus
Amongst White Voters Over Time
Zachary Schwartz
University of Missouri – St. Louis

77

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine the partisan nature of changes in white voters’
attitudes toward racial minorities and immigrants, and to analyze demographic factors like level
of educational attainment and age amongst white voters from 1980 to 2010. I examine
differences between partisan groups to see if some association with one partisan group or
another exists, and if so, how it changes over time. I find feelings of racial resentment and
animus toward immigrants become steadily more associated with white respondents who
identify with the Republican Party, and less associated with those who identify with the
Democratic Party, over time. Moreover, the association between Republican party ID and
animus toward minority groups is intensified when looking only at White Republicans with no
college degree. I demonstrate that white respondents with lower educational attainment are
increasingly identifying as Republicans, and that racial resentment and immigrant animus
account for a great deal of this partisan shift. I also demonstrate that age categories have
decreasing association with subjects’ party identification over time.
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INTRODUCTION
Political scientists, journalists and other political commentators have written for some
time about increasing partisan polarization in American politics. They have noted a diminishing
ideological crossover between Republicans and Democrats in Congress and in the electorate,
and an increasing unwillingness to work together on legislation. Major events like the rise of
social media, intensifying partisan incentives for elected officials, the election of Donald Trump
in 2016, his loss to Joe Biden in 2020, the attack on the US Capitol Building on January 6, 2021,
and a multitude of other factors have occurred alongside an acceleration of this trend in the
past few years, and many argue these factors are actually exacerbating the problem. Other
authors point to the older phenomena of increasing urbanization and its impact on partisan
politics, arguing that liberals and conservatives self-sort into respective urban and rural areas.
This, they argue, creates a condition where people of opposing political viewpoints do not
communicate and cannot relate to one another, forms of geographic resentment and animus
develop, and widening divisions threaten to poison our political system. (Cramer, 2016)
Others, however, note how attitudes toward racial and immigrant groups have shifted along
with increases in partisan divisions over time. While Jim Crow-style overt racism has been
driven to the margins of society, new forms of more subtle and symbolic animus toward
minorities have risen in their stead. Scholars have also noted that these new forms of animus
are associated with voters’ preference for Donald Trump in the 2016 election (Schaffner 2018;
Reny 2019).
It remains unknown, however, how long people harboring these relatively new forms of
animus toward minority groups have favored Republicans. To date, researchers have yet to
examine changes in the association between Party ID and voters’ feelings toward racial minority
and immigrant groups over time. How has the effect of racial and immigrant animus changed
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over time, and how are those changes related to partisanship? Did Trump merely benefit from
pre-existing feelings of animus that no candidate prior would dare take advantage of in such an
explicit way? How are racial resentment and immigrant animus associated with other factors
like the “education gap,” or age, and how has that relationship changed over time?
The purpose of this paper is to examine the partisan nature of changes in white voters’
attitudes toward racial minorities and immigrants over time. I also seek to analyze demographic
factors like level of educational attainment and age amongst white voters that might be
associated with changes to racial and immigrant animus over time. I separate white
respondents into self-reported partisan groups and examine answers to questions designed to
measure one’s feelings of animus toward racial and immigrant groups. I examine differences
between partisan groups from 1980 to 2016 to see if some association with one partisan group
or another exists, and if so, how it changes over time. I then separate white respondents into
age and educational attainment groups to see if party identification differences between the
groups changes across the same time period. I take those results and control for racial and
immigrant animus to see if these feelings account for some of the changes between those
groups. I find feelings of racial resentment and animus toward immigrants become steadily
more associated with white respondents who identify with the Republican Party, and less
associated with those who identify with the Democratic Party, over time. Moreover, the
association between Republican party ID and animus toward minority groups is intensified when
looking only at White Republicans with no college degree. I demonstrate that white
respondents with lower educational attainment are increasingly identifying as Republicans, and
that racial resentment and immigrant animus account for a great deal of this partisan shift. I
also demonstrate that age categories have decreasing association with subjects’ party
identification over time.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The following is a review of political science scholarship relevant to this paper. The 14th
edition of Political Behavior of the American Electorate, by Elizabeth A. Theiss-Morse and
colleagues, serves as a descriptor of broader trends in political behavior after the 2016 election.
Most notably, Donald Trump’s highly unorthodox, inflammatory communication and
campaigning style, and the intensity of the popularity and loyalty amongst his supporters, made
the landscape of the 2016 election was remarkably different than previous election cycles. One
such finding relevant to this dissertation is that whites are becoming a decreasing percentage of
population, and racial diversity continues to increase in the United States. (Theiss-Morse, et
al., 2018)
In White Voters in 21st Century America, George Hawley describes sweeping
demographic changes in the United States over the past five to six decades that to some degree
shed light on voters’ attraction to Trump as a candidate. As a result of increased racial diversity
in the US in the last five to six decades, public discourse on race has shifted, and in its wake, so
has much of the rest of the political landscape, including the major political parties. The
Republican Party has emerged in recent years as a predominantly “white” party, where
Democrats have attracted a much more racially diverse voting base. Hawley notes that, while
they remain the largest racial group in the United States today, whites will eventually be just
another racial minority amongst many and paying attention to the political behavior of “whites
as whites” might be helpful in better explaining shifts and characteristics of the American
electorate. (Hawley, 2014)
Well before 2016, scholars have attempted to wade into specific dynamics and
consequences of this shifting landscape. In “Introduction – ‘Gapology’ and the Presidential
vote,” Laura R. Olson and John C. Green briefly outline emerging partisan voting gaps in race and
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other demographic measures as of 2004. This study serves first as an artifact of partisan voting
gaps between demographic groups, and also illustrates how these characteristics might interact
with one another, and how that might impact partisanship. For example, Olson and Green
observe how age and party identification might be linked. Moreover, as of 2004, the age and
education gap between Republicans and Democrats was relatively small. Those with some
college education or less leaned roughly 7 points in favor of George W Bush in the 2004
Presidential Election, while those with a college degree or more were nearly equally divided
between Bush and John Kerry. The age gap between the partisan choice for President in 2004
was relatively small as well. Similar to education, those respondents 40 years or older leaned in
favor of Bush by 7 points, while those younger than 40 leaned slightly in favor of Kerry by 2
points. (Olson & Green, 2006)
More contemporary scholarship examines these changes through the lens of identity.
Arlie Russell Hochschild’s Strangers in their Own Land is an earnest attempt to hear from
conservatives themselves on what it is they find compelling about their political identity through
“keyhole” issues like the environment, the economic and social pressures they claim emanate
from urban elites, and other factors. She reports the excitement felt by these Louisianans for
the rise of Donald Trump, arguing that Trump made an emotional appeal to their interests that
was beguiling, and would eventually work (Hocschild, 2016). This book provides a qualitative
perspective that attempts to humanize Trump voters and repudiate the “dumb Southerner”
narrative, in which conservative voters are always voting against their own interests.
In another book about conservative identity, The Tea Party and the Remaking of
Republican Conservatism, Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson study the rise and motivations
of the Tea Party movement across the country in early 2009 to its height in the early 2010s, and
the effect it has had on the American right at-large. They attempt to both explain how the Tea
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Party fits in the bigger American Politics picture using large surveys and social science datasets
and observe actual actors closely as they meet with one another and engage with the broader
public to collect more qualitative, human-level observations. (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012)
Ultimately, Skocpol and Williamson’s work is useful because it helps to illustrate a highly
influential shift in the identity of Republicans in the early 2010s. The residue of that movement
is undoubtedly a part of the rise of Trump and may help explain American politics today.
The racial animus research central to this paper is based on the work of Donald Kinder &
Lynn Sanders. Earlier versions of their research in the 1970s and 80s referred to an emergent
form of “symbolic” racism that was replacing Jim Crow-style overt racism in American politics.
They would later coin the term “racial resentment” in their 1996 book Divided By Color, which as
they argue, is much more subtle and sophisticated, and often far more difficult to detect than
Jim Crow racism. Kinder and Sanders describe racial resentment as “… the conjunction of
whites’ feelings toward blacks and their support for American values, especially secularized
versions of the Protestant ethic. (293)” Racial resentment, they argue, manifests in ideas such as
a lack moral of values like individualism and hard work amongst Blacks, or that Blacks do not try
hard enough to overcome difficulties or that they take what they have not earned. They claim
those who express racial resentment feel that these beliefs are central to the white race and
American society at large. They assert that racial resentment is “… the primary ingredient in
white opinion on racial affairs,” which dominates views of white Americans. As a result, the
effect of racial resentment, in their judgement, is felt across a spectrum of racial policies
(Carmines et al. 101).
Kinder and Sanders measure racial resentment using a series of agree versus disagree
style questions. These questions are designed to identify the level of racial resentment in
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respondents to the exclusion of other factors. (106) Kinder and Sanders’ racial resentment
questions are as follows:
7. Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if
they tried.
8. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
9. Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black
than from a white person.
10. Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
11. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
12. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Note that whites are not required to openly admit to any degree of overt racism within
themselves or reveal their opinions on the inferiority of Blacks to whites. Instead, the questions
subtly “…distinguish between those whites who are generally sympathetic toward blacks and
those who are generally unsympathetic (Kinder & Sanders 106).” The questions in both cases
are intended to withdraw expressions of “…subtle hostility without seeming to offend the
democratic values that most subjects would feel bound to support.” (Kinder & Sanders 106)
Kinder and Sanders argue the impact of racial resentment is “unequaled” by any other factor in
shaping voters’ views on “racialized” policies like affirmative action, and is more powerful than
self-interest, support for limited government, ideology, or demographic factors like age, region,
gender, etc. (Carmines 100).
In other research, Donald Kinder and Thomas Nelson demonstrated in 1996 that, while
it is not the only driver of public opinion, group-centrism is an “elemental” in American public
opinion on a diverse range of issues. Most people’s policy preferences are based on how they
feel about the groups who are targeted by those policies, and not on ideological considerations
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or education. Group-centric thought “…functions as an efficient heuristic that conveniently
reduces the complexity of policy politics to a simple judgmental standard. (1056)” Furthermore,
the influence of group-centrism on public opinion is often subject to how an issue or policy is
framed by elites, and by the ever-present possibility of multiple interpretations of the same
policies. Nelson & Kinder argue that group-centrism plays a more prominent role in public
opinion when political elites intentionally frame an issue in a way that highlights differences,
either real or perceived, between groups (1056-57). Group identity is multifaceted and can
manifest in loyalty toward or opposition to a specific candidate or political group. As my
research will show, a given group’s approval or disapproval of the Republican Party can be highly
salient in contemporary American politics. Moreover, group-centrism in the form of party
identification remains the strongest influence on public opinion.
Many scholars have confirmed the claims made in Divided by Color by demonstrating its
salience in contemporary politics. The group-centric nature of public opinion, particularly racial
group identity, is central to contemporary racial resentment measurements, and remains
especially important when their model is applied to white and/or Trump voters. Sides, et al.,
and other scholars used Kinder & Sanders’ racial resentment model to show how white racial
group identity and group-based values led to support for Donald Trump in the 2016 election
(Sides, et al. 2018). Kimball, et al. observe that well-reported increases in partisanship and
political polarization in the American electorate can be directly attributed to group attitudes and
outperform ideological positions in explanations of choice for president in the 2016 election.
(170)
Andrew M. Engelhardt (2019) argues that white voters’ racial attitudes were a key factor
in their choice for presidential candidate in the 2016 election. However, while some scholars
argue that Trump’s racialized rhetoric “activated” these feelings in the 2016 campaign,
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Englehardt argues for an alternate explanation. He observes trends preceding Trump that
suggest white voters have become increasingly polarized into partisan groups as a result of
racial views. He argues that most of the change was driven by Democrats between 2012 and
2016, who have increasingly attracted voters that are supportive of policies and candidates that
benefit racial minorities. (Englehardt, 2019) Englehardt’s piece is useful because it provides an
alternative explanation to a popular view on the cause of Trump’s success. In this study, he
problematizes this view and argues scholars should not always accept one established
explanation for a phenomenon, and should instead be open to multiple hypotheses.
Sides, et al. attempt to clarify important questions related to the 2016 presidential
election in their 2017 article “The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost and Won." They argue
that, in addition to broader pre-existing political and economic factors, choices made in both the
Clinton and Trump campaigns in the 2016 election activated voters’ racial, ethnic and social
identities. “Identity-focused” campaign messaging raised Trump’s cache among white voters
without a college degree, and this would become a huge advantage for him in the Electoral
College. Moreover, Sides, et al. argue that the often-repeated claim that economic
displacement or feelings of anger toward the government amongst rural voters does not explain
Trump’s popularity with whites in 2016. Rather, they argue that attitudes on race explained the
boost in support for Trump amongst white voters. Moreover, they claim the shift of non-college
educated whites toward support for the GOP started well before 2016, during the Obama
Administration. This shift, they argue, was driven in large part by racial attitudes. (Sides, et al,
2017)
Other scholarship reveals the relationship between racial resentment and other
demographic factors such as the widening “education gap” between Trump and non-Trump
voters, in which non-college educated whites supported Trump in 2016 significantly more than
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college-educated whites – the first presidential election cycle where this was evident. Schaffner
et al. argue that widening economic divides made Trump’s populist economic platform more
attractive to white working-class voters. Schaffner, et al. grant assertions made by Bartels and
others that economic concerns amongst non-college educated whites was at least “part of the
story,” although perhaps not the most important factor. (12-13)
Unlike Bartels and company, Schaffner et al. claim racism and sexism acted as a stronger
driver of public opinion toward Trump. They argue this explains the recent “white education
gap” phenomenon where Republican voters are more likely to have lower educational
attainment than Democratic voters. They claim Trump’s racist “birtherism” remarks about
Barack Obama (Serwer, 2020) and sexist remarks about Hillary Clinton (White, 2015) were
appealing to less educated whites, and repellant to more educated whites. (13-15) Schaffner et
al. argue Trump’s appeal to racism and sexism accounts for 2/3rds of the education gap
amongst white voters. Unsurprisingly, group-centrism, and particularly party identification,
again plays a powerful role in this equation as well (11).
Scholarship on the partisan nature of animus towards immigrants is not nearly as robust
and time-tested as racial resentment work. Still, some authors have written on immigrant
animus despite the lack of a parallel model as well-regarded as Kinder & Sanders’ racial
resentment studies. Ramirez and Peterson argue that some Americans express anti-Latino
sentiment caused by beliefs about Latinos’ inability to assimilate to “Anglo-American” norms.
These beliefs, held largely by white Americans, partially explain support for Trump in the 2016
election, as well as support for anti-immigrant Republican candidates in congressional elections.
(Ramirez & Peterson 2020)
Reny, et al. argue that attitudes on immigration and race was a stronger explanation
than feelings of economic dislocation for the shift of white working-class voters to support
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Trump in the 2016 presidential election. They inspect the previously untested claim that
Trump’s combined rhetoric on economics and immigration animated white working-class voters
who did not vote in 2012 to support Trump in 2016. They find that, among those white voters
who switched to either Trump or Clinton, some non-working class white voters, but far more
working-class white voters, switched. Moreover, the primary reason for the switch, they argue,
was due to attitude on race and immigration, not economic concerns. These findings are
relevant to this study because they suggest that white voters are increasingly sorting into
partisan groups based on attitudes on race and immigration, and that feelings of economic
displacement are less important. (Reny, et al. 2019)
My hypotheses on the relationship between party ID amongst white respondents and
racial and immigrant animus are as follows:

•

Hypothesis 1: Feelings of racial resentment and immigrant animus amongst whites become
more associated with identification with the Republican Party, and less associated with the
Democratic Party, over time.

•

Hypothesis 2: Republicans with no college degree have consistently stronger feelings of
racial and immigrant resentment than Republicans as whole over time.

•

Hypothesis 3: The shift in partisanship over time amongst non-college educated whites
toward the Republican Party is associated with increases in feelings of racial resentment
and immigrant animus.

ROAD MAP
This paper is organized as follows: First I describe the data and methodology used in this
study. This includes a description of the variables I use, including recodes made to better match
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each variable to the purposes of this study. I also describe the various quantitative methods
used to analyze their relationships over time. Next, I describe in detail the results of my data
analysis step by step in two subsections. I conclude with an explanation of the implications of
my analysis and suggest future research.
DATA
This study uses questions from the American National Election Survey Cumulative Data
File. I use questions the ANES has collected since the 1980s and observe changes to white
voters’ answers over time. In Subsection 1 I observe the influence of racial resentment and
immigrant animus, and to examine changes to American politics over time. The ANES
Cumulative Data File provides multiple variables useful in answering the questions proposed
above. There are three dependent variables relevant to Subsection 1 that measure levels of
racial resentment and support for/opposition to immigration to the United States amongst
respondents. The ANES Cumulative Data File contains four of Donald Kinder & Lynn Sanders’ six
racial resentment questions, which serve as one of the primary independent variables in
Subsection 1. In their 1996 book Divided by Color, Kinder & Sanders use these questions to
measure a more subtle form of “symbolic” or “cultural” racism that has replaced the Jim Crow
era biological racism. Two of Kinder & Sanders’ questions were removed to ensure other
variables like individualism or patriotism do not unintentionally influence results.
The four questions are as follows:
5. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
6. Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.
7. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try
harder they could be just as well off as whites.
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8. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.

Each question is answered on a 5-point scale from “Agree Strongly” to “Disagree
Strongly,” and half the questions run in opposite directions from the others. “Disagree strongly”
answers to questions 1 and 4 suggest high racial resentment, while the reverse, “Agree
Strongly,” is true for questions 2 and 3. I recode questions 1 and 4 to run in the same causal
direction as 2 and 3, and I average these four variables to create a single racial resentment scale.
This new variable measures racial resentment on a 25-point scale. I rescale the resentment
variable to range from 0 to 1 so that higher scores indicate more racial resentment amongst
respondents. I expect respondents who identify more with the Republican Party to harbor more
feelings of racial resentment than with those who identify with the Democratic Party.
Available measures of immigrant animus in the ANES Cumulative Data File include a
variable measuring feelings toward illegal immigrants, on a 100-point feeling thermometer
scale. A 100 score is the most positive feelings, and a 0 is the most negative. Another variable
asks respondents “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are
permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot,
decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?” A 1 score means a subject
wants the number to be increased, a 3 score means “stay the same,” and a 5 score means a
subject wants it to be decreased. Since I am focused primarily on animus toward immigrants in
this study, I recode this to a binary variable to focus on those selecting the final “decrease”
category versus the remaining respondents. Both of these variables will be used monitor levels
of immigrant acceptance and animus amongst white voters over time.
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The primary dependent variable for Subsection 2 of this study is a 7-point party
identification variable in the ANES Cumulative Data File. A “1” score signifies “Strong
Democrat,” “2” is “Not very strong Democrat,” “3” is “Independent Closer to a Democrat,” “4” is
“Independent,” “5” is “Independent closer to a Republican,” “6” is “Not very strong Republican,”
and “7” is “Strong Republican.” Party identification remains an extraordinarily important
variable in understanding electoral politics in the United States. I use this variable to examine
changes in white voters’ party identification, and judge how that interacts with changes in racial
resentment and immigrant animus over time.
I also collapse the party identification scale into three partisan categories in Subsection
1 of this study. Party identification remains the strongest influence on public opinion in
American politics. If a strong determinant like Party ID is indeed significantly affected by
changes in racial and immigrant attitudes, the impact of racial resentment and immigrant
animus on American politics more generally will be all the more profound.
For the purposes of this study, I am interested primarily in changes to white voters’
views and partisanship over time. The ANES Cumulative Data File contains a variable that asks
respondents to self-identify as one of seven racial groups: “White non-Hispanic,” “Black nonHispanic,” “Asian or Pacific Islander,” “American Indian or Alaska Native,” “Hispanic,” “Other or
multiple races, non-Hispanic” or “Non-white and non-black.” An eighth group did not answer
the question. I recode so only non-Hispanic white respondents are measured, and other racial
categories are dropped. This isolates white voters so they can be examined separately.
I also examine how differences in educational attainment might impact voters’ views. I
use an educational attainment variable from the ANES that asks respondents to report their
highest level of educational attainment. Subjects are categorized into 8 educational attainment
groups: “8 grades or less ('grade school'),” “9-12 grades ('high school'), no diploma,” “12 grades,
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diploma or equivalency,” “12 grades, diploma or equivalency plus non-academic training,”
“Some college, no degree; junior/community college level degree (AA degree),” “BA level
degrees,” “Advanced degrees including LLB.” Or “Don’t Know.” I recode this variable to divide
respondents into 2 groups: non-college and college educated subjects. “Non-college educated”
respondents are those who report having an educational attainment of “Some college, no
degree” or less, and are folded into one cohort. The remaining subjects, categorized as “College
educated,” are those in the “BA Degree” and “Advanced Degree” categories.
Age is another important predictor of voters’ political views, particularly differences
between older and younger voters. The ANES contains a variable that divides respondents into
7 age categories: “17 – 24,” “25 – 34,” “35 – 44,” “45 – 54,” “55 – 64,” “65 – 74,” and “75 – 99
and over.” I recode the age variable into 2 new age group variables. The first of which
combines all age groups under 35 into a “34 years old or younger” cohort, who get a “1” score,
while remaining age groups get a “0”. The second age variable combines age groups of 55 and
over into a “55 years old or older” cohort, who get a “1” score, while the remaining younger age
groups get a “0” score. This isolates respondents into one younger age group and one older age
group, each of which recoded into their own variables that can be treated and examined
separately.
METHODOLOGY
I test my hypotheses in two subsections. In the first section I run a series of tests that
display the mean score of the racial resentment variable and immigrant animus dependent
variables among various cohorts of ANES respondents over time. I examine changes in racial
resentment and immigrant animus across the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s and 2010s between each
cohort. I examine a white Republican, white Republican with no college degree, and white
Democrat cohorts for each dependent variable, for a total of nine. Under all three dependent
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variables, I observe a widening divide between white Republicans and white Democrats, and an
even more exaggerated gap between white Republicans without a college degree and white
Democrats, over time. I find that, from the 1980s to the 2010s, white Republicans and to a
greater degree white Republicans without a college degree, have increased feelings of racial
resentment and immigrant animus. Conversely, white Democrats have decreasing feelings of
racial resentment and immigrant animus over time.
In the second subsection, I examine changes in partisanship amongst white voters. I run
a series of Ordinary Least Squares regression models to examine changes in partisanship
amongst white voters over time. I also observe the influence of demographic variables such as
age and educational attainment over time. I run eight regressions total, two for each decade
from 1980s to the 2010s, measuring responses of white voters only. In each regression I use a
seven-point party ID variable as my dependent variable. In each decade, the first regression
uses the education variable to examine party identification amongst white voters without a
college degree. I also use the two new age variables to examine voters under 35 and voters
over 55. In each decade, I add to the second regression the racial resentment and immigrant
animus variables to examine their influence. I observe differences caused by controlling for the
racial resentment and immigrant animus between the two regressions within each decade and
compare the changes between decades over time. A negative coefficient means Party ID leans
toward Democrats, while a positive coefficient leans Republican.
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PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY DECADE FOR WHITE RESPONDENTS
Table 1 Democrat

Independent

Republican

1980s 44%

13%

42%

1990s 44%

12%

44%

2000s 43%

11%

46%

2010s 38%

14%

49%

MEAN RACIAL RESENTMENT AMONG WHITE RESPONDENTS BY DECADE
Table 2 1980
1990
2000
White 0.63
0.67
0.71
Republicans
White 0.66
0.69%
0.73
Republicans w/
no college
White 0.59
0.59
0.57
Democrats

2010
0.73
0.76

0.50

MEAN THERMOMETER RATINGS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS BY DECADE (WHITE
RESPONDENTS)
Table 3 1980
1990
2000
2010
White 30.5
28.6
30.7
27.6
Republicans
White 28.9
27.9
29.2
26.2
Republicans w/
no college
White 35.5
34.1
41.4
43.6
Democrats

PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS WHO PREFER FEWER IMMIGRANTS
Table 4 1990
2000
White Republicans 58.99%
51.34%
White Republicans 62.35%
57.65%
w/ no college
White Democrats 55.55%
46.10%
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2010
58.04%
63.72%
35.73%

MEAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP
Table 5 1980
No college
Coef. -.310
SE .059
Over 55
-.15
.059
Under 35
.128
.06

1990

2000
-.378
.058
-.253
.06
.162
.056

2010
-.227
.068
-.256
.073
-.228
.077

.152
.055
.010
.061
-.039
.057

MEAN PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP, CONTROLLING FOR RACIAL
RESENTMENT AND IMMIGRANT ANIMUS
Table 6 1980
No college
Coef. -.595
SE .141
Over 55
-.073
.139
Under 35
.123
.140
Racial
.848
Resentment
.280
Illegal Alien
-.009
Thermometer
.003

1990

2000
-.711
.089
-.263
.09
.124
.088
1.732
.176
-.008
.002
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2010
-.533
.105
-.273
.11
-.24
.12
2.584
.222
-.010
.002

-.383
.054
.051
.057
.217
.065
3.153
.110
-.011
.001

RESULTS
To start, there are important partisan shifts in the American electorate worth noting.
Most importantly, Table 1 demonstrates a shift in partisanship amongst white voters from 1980
to 2010. In 1980, white voters’ partisan leans were minor -- 44% Democrats, 42% Republicans
and 13% independents. However, from 1980 to 2010, white voters increasingly identified as
Republicans, and by 2010, white voters were 38% Democrat and 49% Republican -- a 13-point
shift. This change in partisan identification amongst white voters is the context for the
remainder of this study.
The first set of tests for my hypotheses involve the racial and immigration attitudes of
white Americans over time using ANES Cumulative Data, the results of which are displayed in
Tables 1 – 3. These tables report the mean value of each dependent variable – racial
resentment, feelings toward illegal immigrants, and prevalence of the views that the number of
immigrants should decrease – over time. For each table I divide respondents into three groups:
white Republicans, white Republicans without a college degree, and white Democrats. I
examine differences between each group as they change over increments of decades. Available
data for racial resentment and feelings toward illegal immigrants exists from 1980 onward,
where available data for feelings about the current number of illegal immigrants in the United
States starts in 1990. Therefore, the first two tables show changes between the 1980s, the
1990s, the 2000s and the 2010s. The last table does not have data for the 1980s and starts in
the 1990s.
The first set of these comparisons uses racial resentment as a dependent variable, as
illustrated in Table 2. Higher mean scores indicate higher feelings of racial resentment. In the
1980s, there was very little difference between white partisan groups in terms of racial
resentment. White Republicans’ mean racial resentment score in the 1980s is 0.63, while the
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mean score for white Republicans without a college degree is 0.66, and for white Democrats the
mean score is 0.59. Even as early as 1980, these results match the hypothesis that Republicans
tend to have higher feelings of racial animus than Democrats, and that Republicans without a
college degree are even higher. However, the gap between these numbers is not particularly
large: white Democrats’ mean racial resentment score is just 0.04 below the mean score for
white Republicans, and 0.07 below the mean score for white Republicans without a college
degree.
However, this gap grows substantially over time. In the 1990s, white Republicans had a
mean racial resentment score of 0.67, white Republicans without a college degree scored a 0.69,
and white Democrats scored a 0.59. While white Democrats stayed constant, on average,
compared to the 1980s, mean racial resentment increased by 0.03 amongst white Republicans,
and by 0.02 amongst white Republicans without a college degree. In the 2000s, white
Democrats’ mean racial resentment score decreased to 0.57, while white Republicans and white
Republicans with no college degree continued to rise to 0.71, and 0.73, respectively. The trend
continued in the 2010s, where white Democrats’ mean racial resentment score decreased
further by 7 points to 0.50, while white Republicans and white Republicans without a college
degree increased by roughly 3 points each to 0.73 and 0.76, respectively. From 1980 to 2010
the racial resentment gap between white Democrats and white Republicans grew from 0.04 to
0.23 (on the 0-1 scale), a substantial polarization of racial attitudes by party over the course of
four decades. The gap between white Democrats and white Republicans with no college degree
grew from 0.07 to 0.26, an increase of more than 19 points.
Table 3 shows results from a regression that uses a feeling thermometer toward illegal
immigrants as a dependent variable. Here we see a similar pattern of an increasing partisan gap
over time, where higher scores indicate more positive feelings, and lower scores indicate
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negative feelings. In the 1980s, white Republicans’ mean feeling thermometer score toward
illegal immigrants was 30.5, white Republicans with no college degree was 28.9, and white
Democrats was 35.5. White Democrats have more positive feelings toward illegal immigrants
than white Republicans, and more so compared with white Republicans without a college
degree, but again, the gap between groups is not particularly large. White Democrats have
mean ratings 5 points higher than white Republicans, and nearly 7 points higher than white
Republicans with no college degree, not a large difference on the 0-100 thermometer scale.
But like racial resentment, this partisan gap grows over time, albeit unevenly and less
dramatically. In the 1990s, white Democrats’ feelings toward illegal immigrants actually decline
by 1.4 points to 34.1. However white Republicans decline 1.9 points to 28.6, and feelings among
white Republicans with no college degree decline by just over 1 point to 27.7. In the 2000s,
white Democrats’ feelings toward illegal immigrants increased by over 7 points to 41.4. White
Republicans’ feelings rose close to 2 points, back up to 30.7, and feelings among white
Republicans with no college degree also rose roughly 1.5 points to 29.2. In the 2010s the gap
widened further. White Democrats’ feelings toward illegal immigrants rose over 2 points, while
feelings of white Republicans and white Republicans with no a college degree both declined
about 3 points to 27.6 and 26.2, respectively. In summary, feelings toward illegal immigrants
among white Republicans and white Republicans with no college degree decreased slightly but
remained relatively steady overall, while white Democrats’ feelings increased over 8 points,
widening the partisan gap. In the 2010s, white Democrats, on average, felt 16 degrees more
positively toward illegal immigrants than white Republicans, and 17 degrees more positively
than white Republicans with no college degree. From 1980 to 2010 the partisan gap on feelings
toward illegal immigrants therefore increased 11 degrees between white Democrats and white
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Republicans, and 11 degrees between white Democrats and white Republicans with no college
degree.
Table 4 demonstrates regression results that use a dependent variable that asks
respondents their feelings about the number of immigrants in the United States. Since I am
examining negative feelings toward immigrants, I examine changes only in those respondents
who reported the desire to see a decrease in immigrants in the United States. Moreover, this
question was only available on the ANES from 1990 onward so my analysis will start there.
Higher percentages mean more respondents want a decrease in immigrants, and therefore feel
negatively toward them, while lower percentages mean fewer respondents want a decrease in
immigrants. Again, my results illustrate a pattern of widening partisan divide on feelings toward
immigrants. In the 1990s, white Democrats had a slightly lower mean percentage, 55.6%, than
white Republicans (59.0%) and white Republicans with no college degree (62.4), a difference of
3.4 and 6.8 points, respectively. Similar to racial resentment and feelings toward illegal
immigrants, the differences between the partisan groups are not large in the 1990s.
However, the percentage of white Democrats who want to see a decrease in immigrants
steadily declines over time. In 2000, the mean percentage of white Democrats who want to see
fewer immigrants falls nearly 9.5 points to 46.1%, and in 2010 falls another 10.4 points to 35.7%.
This clear and significant trend of more favorability toward immigrants amongst white
Democrats contrasts with a more muddled result amongst white Republicans. The percentage of
both white Republicans and white Republicans with no college degree who want to see a
decrease in immigrants in the United States falls in the 2000s, and then rises again in the 2010s.
In the 2000s, the mean percentage of white Republicans who wanted fewer immigrants fell 7.7
points to 51.3%, and then in the 2010s rose 6.7 points to 58.0%. Similarly, in the 2000s feelings
of white Republicans with no college degree fell 4.7 points to 57.7%, and in the 2010s rose 6
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points to 63.7%. Ultimately, white Republicans would remain steady from 1990 to 2010 on their
desire to decrease the number of immigrants in the United States, while this view among white
Democrats became less common over time. The resulting increase in the partisan gap grew to
22.3 points between white Democrats and white Republicans, and 28.0 points between white
Democrats and white Republicans with no college degree from 1990 to 2010 – an increase of
18.9 and 21.2 points, respectively. Overall, the results show substantial partisan polarization in
attitudes toward African Americans and immigrants among white Americans during the past
four decades.
In the analysis of each dependent variable, one pattern that remains constant is an
increasing racial resentment and immigrant animus gap between white Democrats and white
Republicans. White Democrats report feelings of racial resentment and immigrant animus less
often over time, while white Republicans report either relatively constant, or increasing feelings
of resentment and animus. The trend is only exaggerated when I examine white Republicans
without a college degree, who consistently report stronger feelings of racial resentment and
immigrant animus than white Republicans generally.
Another pattern evident is in the second and third commands, specific to Republican
respondents. In each case, results produced a decrease in immigrant animus measures amongst
both white Republicans and white Republicans with no college degree in 2000, and then a
resurgence in 2010 comparable to, or in some cases greater than, the measures in 1980 and
1990. This dip may have been due to GOP President Bush pushing for immigration reform during
that decade. This suggests some effect of the political environment on Republican voters during
that decade, and a return to the norm afterward. Moreover, this phenomenon does not exist in
the racial resentment analysis. Racial resentment measures amongst Republicans steadily
increase over time with no such dip in 2000.
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In the second set of tests of my hypotheses, I examine a series of OLS regressions using
ANES Cumulative Data for each decade from 1980 to 2010. These regressions demonstrate the
association between racial resentment and immigrant animus, and party identification over
time. In each decade, I run two regressions that test average party ID amongst different groups
of white voters: those with no college degree, those over 55 years of age, and those under 35
years of age. In the first regression I do not control for racial resentment and immigrant animus,
and in the second I do. The difference in results isolates the effect racial resentment and
immigrant animus has on these groups. I do this for each decade and examine changes in model
coefficients over time.
I use a 7-point scale party ID measure as the dependent variable in these regressions.
Negative coefficients indicate a given group favors the Democratic Party, while positive
coefficients indicate a group favors Republicans. To control for racial resentment, I use the
recoded racial resentment score on a 1-point scale. To control for immigrant animus, I use the
same illegal immigrant feeling thermometer variable on a 100-point scale.
My results reveal an association between two measurable changes amongst
respondents over time that support my hypotheses. The first is a shift in party identification
amongst white voters with no college degree, while controlling for age. As Table 5 illustrates, in
the 1980s and 1990s respectively, white voters with no college degree leaned Democrat by .3
and .4 points on a 7-point scale in favor of Democrats. In the 2000s, this preference shrank
slightly, but still favored Democrats by .23 points. However, in the 2010s, white voters with no
college degree favored Republicans by .15 points - a rather abrupt .38-point partisan shift from
the previous decade.
At the same time, I observe a parallel shift in the influence of racial resentment and
immigrant animus on partisan identification over time. As Table 6 illustrates, I observe a steady
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increase in the impact of racial resentment on party ID from 1980 to 2010. In the 1980s, I
observe a coefficient of .85 for the association between racial resentment and party
identification. A 1-standard deviation increase in racial resentment is associated with a .19-point
lean toward identification with the Republican Party in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the racial
resentment coefficient lean in favor of Republicans increases to 1.73, where a 1-standard
deviation increase in racial resentment was associated with a .39-point lean in favor of
Republicans. In the 2000s, the racial resentment coefficient increases in favor of Republicans
again, to 2.58, and a 1-standard deviation increase in racial resentment is associated with a .61point lean in favor of Republicans. Finally, in the 2010s, the racial resentment coefficient
increased in favor of Republicans to 3.15, an increase of 2.3 points since the 1980s. A 1standard deviation increase in racial resentment in 2010 was associated with a .82-point lean in
favor of Republicans, an increase of .64 points since the 1980s. Overall, I observe a steady shift
of increased association between racial resentment and identification with the Republican Party
from 1980 to 2010.
Similarly, I observe an increased association between partisanship and feelings toward
illegal immigrants over time, as Table 5 illustrates. In the 1980s, I observe a coefficient of .009
for the association between ratings of illegal immigrants and party identification. A 1-standard
deviation decline in feelings toward illegal immigrants is association with a 0.20-point lean
toward identification with the Republican Party. In the 1990s, the illegal immigrant
thermometer coefficient decreases to .008, and 1-standard deviation decline in feelings toward
illegal immigrants is associated with a 0.17-point lean in favor of Republicans. In the 2000s, the
illegal immigrant coefficient increases to .010, and a 1-standard deviation decline in feelings
toward illegal immigrants is associated with a 0.23-point lean in favor of Republicans. Finally, in
the 2010s the illegal immigrant coefficient increases to .011, a total change of .003 points since
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the 1980s. In the 2010s, a 1-standard deviation decline in feelings toward illegal immigrants is
associated with a 0.29-point lean in favor of Republicans. While the relationship between racial
resentment and party identification is stronger, I observe an overall increase in the association
of negative feelings toward illegal immigrants and identification with the Republican Party from
1980 to 2010.
Until 2010, white voters without a college degree slightly favored the Democratic Party
when compared to more educated voters. In the 2010s white voters with no college degree
began to favor Republicans for the first time. Over the same time period racial resentment
became increasingly associated with Republican party identification. However, these two
phenomena do not separately confirm my hypothesis, as correlation is not causation. In order
to demonstrate an association between a rise in racial resentment and a partisan shift amongst
non-college education whites, I examine the last set of two OLS regressions. The first OLS
regression shows party identification of three demographic groups, including white respondents
with no college degree, in 2010 without controlling for racial and immigrant resentment. The
whites with no college degree leaned .152-points in favor of Republicans. The second regression
uses the same variables, except I control for racial resentment and immigrant animus. In this
regression, I observe whites with no college degree lean .38 points in favor of Democrats – a
swing of .535 points on a 7-point scale. In simplest terms, when I control for racial resentment
and immigrant animus, the 2010 positive relationship between whites without a college degree
and Republican party identification vanishes. Racial resentment and immigrant animus
therefore contributes to the non-college educated whites’ shift toward Republicans, and I can
reasonably conclude that racial resentment and immigrant animus is associated with Republican
party identification.

103

Another useful, albeit tertiary finding in this study is the changing relationship between
age and party identification. As Table 5 illustrates, my results show a minimal association
between age and party identification. Early on, older voters slightly tended to identify as
Democrats, while younger voters leaned Republican. In 1980, white respondents over 55 leaned
in favor of Democrats by .15 points on a 7-point scale, increased to around .25 points in 1990,
and leveled off in 2000. Meanwhile white respondents under 35 leaned in favor of Republicans
by .13 points in 1980, and by .16 in 1990. By 2000, however, white respondents under 35 had
swing to support Democrats by -.23 points. In 2010, however, the influence of age categories on
party ID vanished, and results became statistically insignificant. Therefore, age plays a minimal
role in party identification for white respondents in the most recent time period.
CONCLUSION
In this study I demonstrate changes in the relationship between partisan identity and
feelings of racial and immigrant animus amongst whites over time. By separating white voters
into three partisan groups and observing changes in attitudes between them over time, I find
that amongst white Republicans, and even more so amongst white Republicans with no college
degree, feelings of racial resentment have steadily increased since 1980. In contrast, I find that
white Democrats’ feelings of racial resentment have declined, making for a widening partisan
gap on feelings of racial resentment.
Using two measures, I find also that feelings of animus toward immigrants between
partisan groups follow a similar pattern as racial resentment. Using a feeling thermometer
toward immigrants, I observe lower feelings toward immigrants among white Republicans, and a
slightly lower number amongst white Republicans with no college, when compared to
Democrats in each decade. But each Republican group’s feelings toward immigrants remain
relatively steady from 1980 to 2010. Similarly, those white Republicans who prefer that the

104

number of immigrants in the United States decrease is higher in every decade than with
Democrats, and this view amongst white Republicans with no college degree is higher than both
white Republicans and Democrats. But in both measures, immigrant animus scores amongst
white Republicans and white Republicans with no college degree remain relatively steady.
However, like racial resentment, I observe a widening partisan gap on feelings of
immigrant animus over time. Most of this widening gap is due to changes amongst Democrats
over time -- Democrats’ feelings toward immigrants steadily increase, and those Democrats who
want to see fewer immigrants in the US steadily decreases. In other words, while feelings
toward immigrants amongst Republicans remain more or less the same from 1980 to 2010,
feelings toward immigrants amongst Democrats improve significantly, therefore widening the
partisan gap. Overall, this means ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans
have intensified over time on feelings of race and immigration.
I also show that shifts in feelings of racial and immigrant animus are connected to the
recent association between white education attainment and Republican party identification. In
the first 3 decades, non-college educated whites lean Democrat. However, in 2010 non-college
educated whites shift to lean Republican for the first time. When I control for racial resentment
and immigrant animus, this effect virtually vanishes, and non-college educated whites appear to
lean Democrat. This means that the shift in partisanship in 2010 among non-college educated
white respondents can be attributed largely to negative feelings on race and immigration.
Moreover, I observe a shift in the influence of age groups as well. Age is often cited as
an important electoral demographic in terms of partisanship, but my results problematize this
claim. In 1980, young voters tended to lean slightly Republican, while older voters lean slightly
Democrat, but by 2010, age was a statistically insignificant predictor of party identification.
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The implications of this research are multifaceted. First, it must be noted that the
partisan divisions over race and immigration began well before the 2016 Trump campaign.
Second, my findings reveal yet another dimension inside which Americans have become
increasingly divided. Democrats and Republicans seem to have fewer ideological values in
common by the year, and as I have shown, feelings on race and immigration can be added to the
list. Moreover, one might reasonably fear that the current political climate is calibrated to only
make matters worse in the future. These divisions are only intensified when political elites
weigh in, and incentives are aligned such that politicians and media figures benefit from the
widening gaps I discuss here. The echo chambering in social media, the increasing spread of
disinformation, the scarcity of venues (both virtual and physical) for productive discussion
between those who differ ideologically, the influence of persisting Trumpism after the 2020
election and more only serve to make matters worse. It is vital that academia, the media,
political elites, etc. shed more light on these divisions before anything can be done to mend
these partitions.
Future research might further investigate the relationship between race and party
identification. Specifically, we do not yet know if beliefs about race and immigration influence
partisan evaluations of candidates and issues.
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CONCLUSIONS
The totality of the causes and consequences of Donald Trump’s success in the 2016
Presidential election remain inadequately understood. A deficiency such as this in the face of
seismic political shifts has begun to motivate many authors into action. While we have begun to
respond, the bewilderment of some of us at the results and aftermath of 2016 illustrates an
intolerable blind spot in academia, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the behavior and
motivations of a large section of the American electorate. This period in American politics,
sometimes referred to as the “Trump era,” will likely be discussed in scholarship and media in
some way for decades, and the scale of the work left to be done may be daunting. I write this
dissertation in part as an admission of my own inability to have anticipated the 2016 results,
even when plenty of evidence existed that may have helped predict it. Those who were
surprised by 2016 ought to take this mistake to heart and learn from it. I also hope to
contribute in whatever miniscule way I can to the growing body of knowledge on this new
“Trump era” that still leaves so many mystified. Honest, dispassionate efforts of social scientists
are an invaluable component to clearing the fog about the drivers and ramifications of our own
behavior on a societal scale.
This dissertation is by no means an attempt to complete the picture. However, I hope
to have expanded our understanding of the American electorate in multiple important ways.
Prior to this dissertation, several questions about white voters had not been answered. Below I
break down my findings by chapter and attempt to explain how they benefit our comprehension
of American voters in 2021 and beyond.
In chapter 2, using Luttig, et al. as a model, I administer a subtle political cue as a tool to
illustrate how sensitive white voters are to cues on immigration to test how they affect answers
to a question on access to voting. (Luttig, et al., 2017) Luttig, et al. measure discrepancies in
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feelings of racial animus between Trump and Clinton voters using a methodology in which
respondents are randomly separated into two groups. One group sees a picture of a dismayed
white man standing in front of a house with a foreclosure sign in their lawn, and the other group
sees a picture of Black man in the same setting, with all other elements in the picture remaining
constant. Under the picture, all respondents are asked precisely the same question about a
government program to help Americans avoid foreclosures, with no reference to race or to the
pictures themselves. Luttig, et al. sought to measure the difference in responses to the question
after having been primed by the picture cue to see if Trump and Clinton voters respond
differently to the question when they see a Black man versus when they see a white man.
Indeed, Luttig, et al. found that those who reported to plan to vote for Trump in 2016
responded more negatively to the question after having seen the picture of the Black man than
after having seen a picture of the white man. Conversely, Clinton voters responded more
positively to the program after having seen the picture of the Black man. In other words, Luttig,
et al. found that the choice to support Trump has a “moderating” effect on reactions to this
subtle racial cue. While Trump and Clinton voters in 2016 were already polarized on foreclosure
policies, a racial cue widens the gap in feelings toward this policy, and voters become even more
polarized. This study sheds light on the level of sensitivity voters have toward subtle racial cues,
and how it affects their feelings on arguably race-neutral policies. However, this research
measures voters’ responses in 2016 alone; no such research exists post-2016. Moreover, this
research measures an association with feelings of racial animus but does not measure voters’
feelings toward immigrants.
In Chapter 2 I applied Luttig, et al.’s methodology to a post-2016 sample of respondents
and used a subtle picture cue intended to illicit feelings on immigrants and immigration. Using
data collected from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I measure the degree to
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which Trump and non-Trump voters respond to a set of pictures. 1000+ respondents were
randomly separated into 3 groups. The test group sees a picture of a sign that reads “Vote
Here” in English, Mandarin and Spanish with an arrow pointing into the door of a polling place.
Another group sees the same picture, except the sign reads “Vote Here” in English only. The
third control group sees no picture. All respondents are then asked precisely the same three
questions on their feelings toward a government program designed to help register voters. The
questions make no mention or implication of immigration, nor do they reference the pictures. I
seek to measure differences in responses of Trump and non-Trump voters’ feelings toward voter
registration policy between those with and without the conditioning of the immigrant cue.
Similar to Luttig, et al. I find a “moderating” effect of the choice to support Trump in
2018 in responses to the subtle cue. While they were already dramatically divided on questions
about government policies designed to expand voter registration, my results illustrate that the
divide between Trump and non-Trump voters expands after having been conditioned by the
immigrant cue on two of the three questions asked (results of the third question were
statistically insignificant). When Trump voters are shown the multilingual “Vote Here” picture
their feelings toward the policy are slightly more negative than the English-only group and the
control group. Conversely, non-Trump voters in the multilingual group have more positive
feelings toward the policy than the English-only and control groups. Moreover, the effect of the
multilingual cue is consistently larger among non-Trump voters than the reverse effect among
Trump voters. In sum, my results show a net widening of the gap in feelings between Trump
and non-Trump voters toward a vague voter registration policy when respondents are shown a
subtle political cue designed to illicit feelings on immigration and immigrants.
My results in Chapter 2 in no way demonstrate increased feelings of animus amongst
Trump voters toward immigrants, nor do they demonstrate increased feelings of support or
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empathy amongst non-Trump voters. Rather, they illustrate that Americans on either political
side have some response toward quite subtle cues of increased immigration throughout the
country, and the effect those suggestions might have on their feelings toward voter registration
policy. This suggests a high level of sensitivity amongst voters on their feelings toward
immigration, and how it might interact with their opinions on otherwise unrelated policies. It
also suggests that this sensitivity toward immigrant cues tends to expand pre-existing
bifurcations on feelings toward voter registration policy between Trump and non-Trump voters.
While much more research needs to be conducted to confirm this conclusion, one might
reasonably speculate that Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric on immigration is at least one driver of
the exaggeration in divisions between voters associated with the immigrant cue.
Where Chapter 2 leaves off, in Chapter 3 I attempt to measure an association between
support for Trump and animus toward minority groups. To date, authors have linked Trump’s
success in 2016 to his supporters’ feelings of “racial resentment.” This is a term coined in the
work of Kinder & Sanders that refers to a more symbolic, subtle form of racial animus, which
they claim replaced the overt racism of the Jim Crow era. Kinder & Sanders, amongst many
other authors, claim that racial resentment has an extraordinary impact on American politics
today, including the outcome of the 2016 Presidential Election. However, many questions about
racial resentment remain. One might argue that Trump’s rhetoric toward immigrants has been
more frequent, more explicit and more inflammatory, and yet few researchers to date have
examined how feelings of resentment toward immigrants might have an effect on American
politics similar to that of racial resentment. Moreover, no researcher has yet measured the
association of racial resentment or immigrant animus on electoral politics after the 2016
election. We also do not know the degree to which racial resentment or immigrant animus acts
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as a driver of voters’ support for or opposition to Trump’s loyal GOP allies in high-level elected
offices across the country in the 2018 midterms.
In Chapter 3, I measure the degree to which respondents’ feelings of racial resentment
and immigrant animus are associated with their level of approval for Trump as President, and to
their partisan choice for representative in the US House and Senate, and Governor in the 2018
mid-term elections. I used 4 regression models with data from the 2018 American National
Election Survey (ANES) pilot study to measure the degree to which racial resentment and
immigrant animus are statistically associated with support for Trump, and for his GOP allies in
US Congress and Governorships across the country. By combining answers to relevant questions
on the ANES into single scores, I created new independent variables to measure both racial
resentment and immigrant animus. I measure the relationship between these independent
variables and four separate dependent variables: feelings of approval or disapproval of Trump in
2018, and respondents’ partisan choice in the 2018 midterm elections for US House, US Senate
and Governor, respectively. I include additional variables to control for party identification,
race, gender, education and age.
As is frequently noted in political science literature, party identification has the
strongest effect on one’s partisan choices for various offices. While this is an intuitive and
unsurprising result, I find that, even when controlling for the strong effect of party identification,
racial resentment and immigrant animus have a significantly stronger statistical association with
one’s choice to support Trump and to vote for GOP candidates in 2018 than the remaining
control variables. In other words, subjects who reported having feelings of racial resentment
and animus toward immigrants continue to be strongly associated with feelings of approval for
Donald Trump as president after the 2016 election.
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I also show that negative attitudes toward Blacks and immigrants are strongly
associated with respondents’ choice to vote for Republican candidates for US House, US Senate
and Governor. During his tenure as president, Trump was undoubtedly the leader of the
Republican Party, in both formal and informal terms. In their 2018 campaigns, most GOP
candidates for US House, US Senate and Governor supported Trump tacitly, if not overtly,
despite his continued inflammatory rhetoric on race and immigration. Those who chose to
speak out against Trump were relentlessly criticized on Twitter and in the news, which in the
best cases made campaigns and primaries much more competitive. In the worst cases, Trump
critics resigned or lost primaries to Trump allies. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a vote for
GOP in the 2018 midterms is in most cases a signal of support for Trump by proxy. My results
illustrate an association between racial and immigrant animus and support for GOP candidates
above other demographic variables as well.
In summary, one might reasonably expect that Trumpism will likely continue to be
influential in American politics. We can therefore surmise important implications in American
electoral politics if we accept the conclusion that support for Trump remains associated with
racial and immigrant animus. Not the least of which is that racism and anti-immigrant
sentiment continue to influence our political system. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize
as well that racial resentment and immigrant animus have a much stronger association with
support for Trump and the GOP than demographic factors that are often used to explain the
success of Trump. These findings problematize other explanations for support for Trump and
his allies, such as the idea that low educational attainment was a driver of support for Trump.
CHPT 4
My findings in Chapters 2 & 3, while perhaps may be useful on their own, are made all
the more informative if they are placed in a more historical context. A common practice of
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political scientists is to place current circumstances on a timeline within a longer narrative. This
helps tell the story of how we got where we currently are. Such an exercise can help illuminate
whether things like racial and immigrant animus have gotten better or worse over time amongst
certain groups, help predict how things may unfold in the future, etc. Authors of all kinds can
then take this newly uncovered timeline, that by itself sheds light in an important but narrow
area of study and make more robust the larger narrative about the development of American
Politics in recent decades.
In Chapter 4 I attempted to add to scholarship by measuring changes over time between
feelings of minority group animus and party identification amongst white voters. I also test the
relevancy of demographic factors such as educational attainment and age in this relationship.
Using data from the ANES Cumulative Data File, which has information relevant to this study
dating back to 1980, I compare changes over the decades in the share of those who report
feelings of racial resentment and immigrant animus between the two major political parties in
the US. I use an average of racial resentment questions similar to that in Chapter 3 as one of my
dependent variables. To measure immigrant animus, I use two ANES variables separately:
feeling thermometer rating toward illegal immigrants, and percent of respondents who prefer
the United States had fewer immigrants. I use 7-point scales to measure partisanship and
recode so to only measure responses of white voters. I also recode an ANES educational
attainment variable to sort subjects into two groups: those with and those without a college
degree. In part I, I examine the difference in the percentage of Republicans’ and Democrats’
feelings in 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010, and then observe changes in the distribution over time.
Since much has been made in popular media of the comparably low level of educational
attainment of Trump voters to non-Trump voters, I also examine changes in feelings of racial
resentment and immigrant animus amongst white Republicans with no college degree from
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1980 to 2010. In Part II, I run OLS regressions for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 to observe changes
in partisanship amongst white voters over time, controlling for the influence of age and
educational attainment. I then run the same regressions for each decade again but add the
racial resentment average and the illegal alien immigrant thermometer as a control. I compare
results between regressions for each decade and analyze the effect racial resentment and
immigrant animus has on changes in party identification over time. I also examine changes in
the effect of age on party identification over time.
My results in part I illustrate a widening partisan gap on feelings of racial and immigrant
animus. In 1980, the percent of white Republicans who reported feelings of racial resentment,
negative feelings toward illegal immigrants, and the desire for fewer immigrants in the US was
only slightly higher than that of Democrats. However, over the decades, these gaps would
steadily increase, where white Republicans’ feelings of racial resentment and immigrant animus
would increase, and white Democrats’ feelings would decrease. The difference between white
Republican and Democrat percentages of feelings of racial resentment and the two measures of
immigrant animus would grow from roughly 4-5 point spread in 1980 to roughly 25, 16 and 22
points, respectively, in 2010. Moreover, feelings of racial resentment and immigrant animus
amongst white Republicans were only amplified when I isolated only those without a college
degree. White Republicans with no college degree reported roughly 2-3 percentage points
more racial resentment and immigrant animus in every decade from 1980 to 2010.
My results in part II produced several relevant conclusions. First, I observe a partisan
shift of white respondents with no college degree from 1980 to 2010. In 1980, 1990 and 2000,
whites with no college degree leaned slightly in favor of Democrats. However, my results
demonstrate that in 2010, white voters with no college degree leaned in favor of Republicans by
a small margin for the first time. Second, I observe that while white Republicans were slightly

115

more likely to report feelings of racial resentment and immigrant animus in 1980, the difference
was quite small. However, similar to my findings in part I, this margin steadily grew from 1980
to 2010, and white voters with feelings of racial resentment and immigrant animus increasingly
identified with the Republican Party. Finally, in examining both the partisan shift in whites with
no college degree and feelings of racial and immigrant animus, I observe a third important result
here. In comparing the regressions with and without the racial and immigrant animus controls
in part II, I notice that the shift in partisanship amongst whites with no college degree vanishes
when I control for racial resentment and immigrant animus. In other words, the partisan shift of
whites with no college degree toward Republicans in 2010 is strongly associated with the shift in
racial and immigrant animus toward Republicans.
One additional finding is that, from 1980 to 2010, the partisan relationship to age
changed as well. In 1980, voters over 55 leaned slightly in favor of Democrats, and voters under
35 leaned slightly in favor of Republicans. By 2010, age no longer had a statistically significant
relationship with party identification.
The results in this chapter suggest that the current relationship between racial
resentment and partisan identification amongst white voters is relatively new. Just a few
decades ago, racial resentment and immigrant animus was not so strongly associated with one’s
partisan ID and was instead spread more evenly across parties. However, a profound shift
occurred over the next several decades where the partisan gap on feelings of racial resentment
and immigrant animus would steadily grow, and the majority of white voters who reported
feelings of animus became Republicans. Moreover, just over a decade ago, whites with no
college degree leaned Republican for the first time. My results suggest this shift is strongly
associated with feelings of racial resentment.
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Although more research is needed to establish a statistical association, a few important
events occurred during this shift that are worth speculating about. First, one might reasonably
note that Barrack Obama, a Democrat and the first Black President of the United States, held
office from 2009 to 2017 – the period when racial resentment reached its most recently
recorded peak -- and was then replaced by Donald Trump, a President who is known for his
racially inflammatory rhetoric. Future research might investigate whether the shifts I observed
are in some way related to Obama’s historic election.
Second, scholars and reliable datasets have for decades illustrated how the US is
becoming a racially diversifying country. Hawley notes that this trend of increasing diversity has
been occurring since the 1960s, and recommends scholars begin to study whites as their own
racial minority amongst others, rather than the dominant voting block it once was (Hawley,
2014). Census Data has for decades confirmed this finding, demonstrating that Asians, Hispanics
and Blacks have been making up larger and larger percentages of the US population. Moreover,
the 2020 Census showed for the first time that white American’s numbers are shrinking in the
United States (US Census Bureau, 2021). While more research is required to confirm this, one
might reasonably hypothesize that changing demographics toward a more racially and ethnically
diverse American electorate, culture, population, etc. might illicit feelings of a loss of power and
dominance amongst some whites. This perhaps might also lead to increased feelings of
resentment and animus amongst some whites toward these growing groups. If we adopt this
assumption, it might therefore be possible that these whites felt the need over time to
increasingly consolidate their power beneath the banner of one political party. Moreover, as a
candidate for US President, Donald Trump’s inflammatory racial and immigration rhetoric might
have been an attractive message to these voters, which energized them to support him and his
supporters in the GOP at the polls in 2016 and beyond.
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